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SUSTAINABLE AND UNCHALLENGED 
ALGORITHMIC TACIT COLLUSION 
Ariel Ezrachi* & Maurice E. Stucke** 
 
ABSTRACT—Algorithmic collusion has the potential to transform future 
markets, leading to higher prices and consumer harm. And yet, algorithmic 
collusion may remain undetected and unchallenged, in particular, when it is 
used to facilitate conscious parallelism. The risks posed by such undetected 
collusion have been debated within antitrust circles in Europe, the US, and 
beyond. Some economists, however, downplay algorithmic tacit collusion 
as unlikely, if not impossible. “Keep calm and carry on,” they argue, as 
future prices will remain competitive. This paper explores the rise of 
algorithmic tacit collusion and responds to those who downplay it, by 
pointing to new emerging evidence and the gap between law and this 
particular economic theory. We explain why algorithmic tacit collusion is 
not only possible but warrants the increasing concerns of many enforcers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As one law firm noted in 2018, “[p]rice algorithms are clearly the 
‘talk of the town’ in the European competition law community these 
days.”1 During the summer of 2018, the law firm noted, 
[B]oth the Federal Cartel Office and the Austrian Federal Competition 
Authority have addressed the question of whether the use of price algorithms 
can lead to excessive ticket prices in the airline industry. . . . [T]he French 
Autorité de la Concurrence and the Federal Cartel Office announced the 
launch of a joint research project to investigate algorithms and their 
implications on competition.2 
The European Commission is seeking input on these issues, as well.3 
The German Monopolies Commission, in its 2018 report, recommended the 
government “to systematically investigate markets with algorithm-based 
pricing for adverse effects on competition.”4 Among the key concerns 
raised are pricing algorithms that help competitors elude detection for their 
price-fixing or algorithms that – with or without the help of humans – 
tacitly collude. With tacit collusion (also known as, “conscious 
parallelism”), there is not any illegal agreement or even any contact or 
communication among the competitors. Instead, each competitor acts 
unilaterally, in response to the behavior of its rivals, to raise price above 
competitive levels. 
In our earlier writing, we outlined four key scenarios where 
algorithms may be used to facilitate collusion,5 and in 2016, we provided 
further context and analysis in our book, Virtual Competition: The Promise 
 
 1 Christian Ritz & Lorenz Marx, Digital Competition Policy on the Move: Price Algorithms in the 
German Monopolies Commission’s Spotlight – European Commission Launches Consultation Process, 




 2 Id. 
 3 See Jean Tirole, Shaping Competition Policy in the Era of Digitization, EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 17, 
2019), https://webcast.ec.europa.eu/shaping-competition-policy-in-the-era-of-digitisation [https://perma
.cc/ZSL6-CXQP] (advance video to 03:30:27). 
 4 Press Release, Monopolkommission [German Monopolies Commission], Digital Change 
Requires Legal Adjustments Regarding Price Algorithms, The Media Sector and the Supply of 
Medicines, MONOPOLIES COMM’N (July 3, 2018), https://www.monopolkommission.de/images/
HG22/PM_HG_2018_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW5S-UB8Z]. 
 5 Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit 
Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1782-84 (2017); see also Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, 
Emerging Antitrust Threats and Enforcement Actions in the Online World, 13 COMPETITION L. INT’L 
125, 129 (2017). 
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and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy.6 Finally, we engaged in 
further thematic development in our submissions to the U.K. House of 
Lords7 and OECD,8 and testimony at the Federal Trade Commission 
hearings on algorithmic collusion.9 
Broadly, we have gleaned general consensus over our first two 
scenarios: Messenger, where humans agree to collude by fixing the price 
for their competing products and use algorithms to facilitate their collusion; 
10 and Hub and Spoke, where a common intermediary facilitates price-
fixing among competitors who use the intermediary’s services.11 Indeed, 
the European Commission and United States antitrust authorities, among 
others, raised concerns that algorithms could facilitate collusion12 and have 
 
 6 ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF 
THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY (2016). 
 7 Written evidence from Professor Ariel Ezrachi and Professor Maurice E. Stucke Submitted to 
Select Committee on European Union Internal Market Subcommittee, Online Platforms and the EU 
Digital Single Market, U.K. PARLIAMENT (Oct. 16, 2015), http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/
committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-internal-market-subcommittee/online-platforms-and-the-
eu-digital-single-market/written/23223.html [https://perma.cc/6NDQ-TEVF]; SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
EUROPEAN UNION, ONLINE PLATFORMS AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET, 2015-16, HL 129 passim 
(UK). 
 8 Note by Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Algorithmic Collusion: Problems and Counter-
Measures, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)25 (May 31, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/
DAF/COMP/WD(2017)25/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/53AY-V74Y]. 
 9 Transcript of FTC Hearings Session No. 7: Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st 
Century - Day 2, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N 19-84 (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_events/1418693/ftc_hearings_session_7_transcript_day_2_11-14-18_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5V8Y-NQXA]. 
 10 Here humans agree to collude and turn to pricing algorithms to help implement their cartel. The 
commonly programmed algorithm can reduce the incentives of cartel members to deviate and thereby 
contribute to the cartel’s stability, by implementing the agreed upon price, improving the detection of 
any cheating from this price, and enabling the other cartel members’ algorithms to quickly retaliate by 
matching or lowering price. From an enforcement perspective, the law is straight-forward, but the 
agency’s detection of the cartel may be harder, when the use of similar pricing algorithms reduces the 
need of humans to regularly communicate to monitor their cartel. 
 11 At times, a seller may outsource its ongoing dynamic pricing adjustments to a third party whose 
advanced algorithms continually process market data to update prices and optimize profits. Such 
agreements enable a seller that lacks the algorithms and market data to benefit from dynamic pricing. 
When competitors increasingly use the same third-party pricing algorithm, one company, the “hub,” can 
materially impact the industry price and dampen competition. See Opinion of Advocate General 
Szpunar delivered on 11 May 2017, Case C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v. Uber Systems 
Spain SL, ECLI:EU:C:2017:364, at 13 n. 23 (noting that “the use by competitors of the same algorithm 
to calculate the price is not in itself unlawful, but might give rise to hub-and-spoke conspiracy concerns 
when the power of the platform increases”); see also Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 822-27 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that plaintiffs plausibly alleged a hub-and-spoke conspiracy in which drivers 
sign up for Uber precisely on the understanding that the other drivers were agreeing to the same pricing 
algorithm, and in which drivers’ agreements with Uber would be against their own interests were they 
acting independently), reconsideration denied in part, 185 F. Supp. 3d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 12 Note from the European Union, Algorithms and Collusion, OECD Doc. 
DAF/COMP/WD(2017)12, at 7 (June 14, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD
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opened investigations on these scenarios.13 Most policy makers recognize 
how “pricing algorithms may make price fixing attempts more frequent and 
potentially more difficult to detect.”14 Most say “with confidence . . . that 
the rise of pricing algorithms and AI software will require changes in our 
enforcement practices;” and most would agree that enforcers “need to 
understand how algorithms and AI software work in particular markets.”15 
What has sparked debate, however, are our third and fourth scenarios, 
namely Tacit Collusion on Steroids – where humans program their pricing 
algorithms to monitor and respond to rivals’ pricing and other keys terms 
of sale, and they know that the likely outcome will be conscious parallelism 
and higher prices (without the need of the rivals to communicate with each 
other or otherwise enter into an illegal cartel agreement), and Artificial 
Intelligence and the Digital Eye – where we predict that advances in 
machine learning and increases in market transparency may eventually 
enable self-learning algorithms to unilaterally determine the profit-
maximizing price. Under the right market conditions, the self-learning 
algorithms may independently arrive at tacit collusion, without the 
knowledge or intent of their human programmers. 
 
(2017)12/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/9CCF-S72G]; Note by United States, Algorithms and Collusion, 
OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)41, at 6 (May 26, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/
COMP/WD(2017)41/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/8U89-NJL8] (“[I]f competing firms each entered into 
separate agreements with a single firm (for instance a platform) to use a particular pricing algorithm, 
and the evidence showed they did so with the common understanding that all of the other competitors 
would use the identical algorithm, that evidence could be used to prove an agreement among the 
competitors that violates U.S. antitrust law.”). But if the competitors independently and unknowingly 
adopted the same or similar pricing algorithms, this would “unlikely to lead to antitrust liability even if 
it makes interdependent pricing more likely.” Id. An interesting issue is whether the competitors would 
be liable if they intentionally but unilaterally adopted the same algorithm knowing that this would make 
interdependent pricing more likely. 
 13 See, e.g., Daniel Mandrescu, When Algorithmic Pricing Meets Concerted Practices- the Case of 
Partneo, CORE BLOG (June 7, 2018), http://coreblog.lexxion.eu/when-algorithmic-pricing-meets-
concerted-practices-the-case-of-partneo/ [https://perma.cc/H6LS-NFFF] (discussing the car makers’ use 
of Accenture’s car part pricing algorithm, Partneo, which was “designed to identify the maximum price 
consumers would be willing to pay for (visible) cars parts such as fenders or bumpers where there is 
almost no inter or intra brand competition” and how during the period of 2008 to 2013 the five major 
carmakers “boosted their revenues by more than 1 billion dollars thanks to using Partneo, which 
increased the prices of their inventory with 15% on average”); Tom Bergin & Laurence Frost, RPT-
INSIGHT-Software and Stealth: How Carmakers Hike Spare Parts Prices, REUTERS (June 4, 2018, 
1:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/autos-software-pricing/rpt-insight-software-and-stealth-
how-carmakers-hike-spare-parts-prices-idUSL5N1T60H9 [https://perma.cc/HTU6-DFZV]. No formal 
findings, however, have been found against the carmakers or Accenture. 
 14 Terrell McSweeny, Comm’r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Algorithms and Coordinated Effects, 




 15 Id. 
17:217 (2020) Algorithmic Tacit Collusion 
221 
These two categories raise significant policy issues, as they suggest 
that in the future, pricing algorithms may facilitate higher (supra-
competitive) prices, without triggering antitrust intervention. Furthermore, 
such algorithmic tacit collusion can arise in markets where such tacit 
collusion previously among humans would have been unstable. As we 
elaborate below, the possible use of algorithms for price coordination, 
below the antitrust radar screen, raises challenging policy questions. 
Among them: 
 Should our current antitrust policy towards conscious 
parallelism (which was designed based on human interaction) 
apply when price optimization algorithms enhance the 
competitors’ ability to tacitly collude? 
 Is the legal concept of agreement outdated for computer 
algorithms? Are our current antitrust laws sufficient to deter 
and prevent algorithmic tacit collusion? 
 How can the agencies identify when algorithmic collusion 
occurs, especially when pricing is dynamic? 
 What additional measures should be considered to reduce the 
additional risks associated with the industry-wide use of price 
optimization algorithms? 
 In what way should firms be obligated to integrate ethics and 
legality into a computer program? 
 Should companies have an affirmative duty to program the 
computers so as to not tacitly collude? 
While competition agencies and international organizations have 
debated these challenging questions, some have argued that the issue is 
moot. Several economists put forward the claim that the likelihood, in 
practice, of tacit collusion in either the brick-and-mortar economy or digital 
economy, is minimal. They argue that algorithmic tacit collusion should 
not pose any concern because collusion is unsustainable without supporting 
communications between humans.16 According to this view, tacit collusion 
with three or more rivals - whether by algorithms or humans - is unlikely, 
 
 16 Ulrich Schwalbe, Algorithms, Machine Learning, and Collusion, 14 J. COMPETITION L. ECON. 
568, 600 (2019); Thibault Schrepel, Here’s Why Algorithms Are NOT (Really) A Thing, 
CONCURRENTIALISTE (May 15, 2017), https://leconcurrentialiste.com/2017/05/15/algorithms-based-
practices-antitrust/ [https://perma.cc/P4CX-XVK8]; Kai-uwe Kühn & Steve Tadelis, Algorithm 
Collusion, CRESSE (2017), http://www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/2017_sps5_pr2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y2G5-5A4K]; Transcript of FTC Hearings Session No. 7: Competition and Consumer Protection in the 
21st Century - Day 1, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/public_events/1418693/ftc_hearings_session_7_transcript_day_1_11-13-18_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EZZ8-BRYX]; Transcript of FTC Hearings Session No. 7: Competition and 
Consumer Protection in the 21st Century - Day 2, supra note 9. 
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as the “coordination problems are hard to solve without communication, 
even in simple static games.”17 These communications, the argument goes, 
can be captured under current antitrust laws such as Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – and US 
antitrust provision – Section 1 of the Sherman Act. And so, because pricing 
algorithms cannot tacitly collude without rivals actually communicating 
with each other, the antitrust laws would capture these communications 
among humans, and thus the current antitrust tools would suffice for the 
digital economy. 
In this paper, we elaborate on the phenomenon of algorithmic tacit 
collusion and consider it in light of the claim that, in practice, such 
collusion is unlikely without communications. We note how this claim has 
not slowed the enforcers’ interest and momentum to tackle the policy issues 
underlying algorithmic tacit collusion. 
In Part I, we outline the theory and the way pricing algorithms, in 
specific market conditions, may foster tacit collusion (also referred to as 
conscious parallelism or oligopolistic price coordination). 
In Part II, we tackle the instability of tacit collusion. We consider the 
claim that absent some human communication, tacit collusion is inherently 
unsustainable. This belief is based on experimental economics and the 
difficulty of sustaining tacit collusion under certain laboratory conditions. 
According to this view, the model of tacit collusion will rarely manifest 
itself in the real world without some supporting communication. 
We explain how the economic observations at the core of this claim 
diverge from antitrust law and enforcement policies. When observing the 
market reality, courts and enforcers on both sides of the Atlantic have seen, 
in the brick-and-mortar economy, durable tacit collusion that seemingly 
occurs without any human communication between rivals. Basically, 
competitors, watching each other like hawks, steadily raise their prices 
above competitive levels. Because this durable tacit collusion can occur 
without any human communication, the courts require from the enforcer or 
private plaintiff proof of express collusion, namely, sufficient direct or 
circumstantial evidence of an agreement or illicit communication among 
the competitors. Absent this evidence, the courts say that the rivals’ parallel 
behavior is legal. Because the conduct is otherwise legal, the primary 
mechanism to prevent tacit collusion is merger review.18 To put it simply, 
 
 17 See Kühn & Tadelis, supra note 16; see also Schwalbe, supra note 16, at 592. 
 18 As we discuss infra in Part II, enforcers, when appraising proposed acquisitions, may block 
mergers that significantly increase the risk of tacit collusion. They expect “industry awareness” would 
allow rivals to engage in conscious parallelism post-merger without the need of any illicit 
communications. 
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enforcers and antitrust plaintiffs search hard for evidence of express 
collusion and communication, but these parties and courts ultimately 
recognize that anticompetitive parallel behavior can arise without 
communications among the rivals, and thus, comfortably occur within the 
zone of legality. Indeed, this parallel behavior among competitors happens 
with sufficient frequency that neither the EU nor US law presume any 
illicit communication. 
Part III addresses the debate as to the added risk offered by algorithms 
(without express communication). We note how humans may program 
algorithms to reflect the logic behind conscious parallelism - punish 
deviations and follow price increases. We note how the use of similar 
algorithms by competitors and the ability to identify the strategy employed 
by others, may further stabilize conscious parallelism. Importantly, we 
explain that when executed carefully, and absent illicit communication, 
these unilateral strategies would not trigger antitrust intervention under 
current laws. 
As part of this discussion, we also consider possible future 
technologies and the capacity of self-learning algorithms to adopt a 
strategy, which may lead to price increases (absent illegal collusion). The 
question here is whether in some future markets, tacit collusion could be 
sustained without human intervention. 
In Part IV we offer policy makers tools to better understand the risks 
of algorithmic tacit collusion. Interestingly, some scholars, taking up our 
suggestion to develop algorithmic tacit collusion incubators, are doing just 
that, and we report some of their recent findings. While still in the early 
stages of research, their findings, which illustrate the possibility for 
algorithmic tacit collusion, suggest that competition authorities have 
reasonable grounds for their concerns. 
This issue is both timely and important. If an antitrust agency accepts 
the view that tacit collusion is impossible without human communication, 
then it need not worry about algorithms tacitly colluding. This can play out 
two ways. First, rather than keep a close eye on these technological 
developments and consider potential policy responses, the enforcer would, 
as some urge, do nothing. It will not develop algorithmic tacit collusion 
incubators or conduct market inquiries. It will not even distinguish between 
legitimate human tacit collusion and enhanced algorithmic tacit collusion, 
nor would it consider what forms of enhancement may be caught as 
facilitating practices or signaling, or which action may qualify as 
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collusion.19 In short, the agency would continue with its leniency program 
for price fixers20 and sniff out cases where humans still conspire. 
Second, the agency’s merger review will remain incomplete, as it will 
not appreciate the increased likelihood for tacit collusion in industries 
dominated by pricing algorithms. At present, agencies lack good predictive 
models of when a merger significantly increases the likelihood of tacit or 
express collusion. As one economist explained it to the entering Honors 
Program lawyers at the US Department of Justice Antitrust Division in the 
mid 1990s, “the merger occurs and s*** happens.” Not surprisingly, 
merger review in recent decades has primarily focused on unilateral effects, 
which are relatively easier to model and estimate.21 However, as more 
markets become more concentrated and more susceptible to tacit collusion, 
the harm from ignoring (or downplaying) this risk in merger review 
increases. 
I. ALGORITHMIC TACIT COLLUSION – THE BASE CONDITIONS 
Let us first consider the general consensus on tacit collusion. 
Everyone agrees that it is a challenging area for antitrust enforcement, as it 
leads to an anticompetitive outcome (namely, higher prices, reduced 
output, or allocated markets) without any illegal agreement among 
competitors.22 As the OECD noted, “Although there is great variance in 
how jurisdictions interpret the notion of agreement, they traditionally 
require some sort of proof of direct or indirect contact showing that firms 
 
 19 Joseph E. Harrington Jr, Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous Price-
Setting Agents, 14 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 331 (2018). 
 20 See generally Corporate Leniency Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
atr/corporate-leniency-policy [https://perma.cc/DSU8-MR9V]. 
 21 See, e.g., Malcolm B. Coate, The Merger Review Process in the Federal Trade Commission from 
1989 to 2016 (Feb. 28, 2018) (unpublished working paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955987 
[https://perma.cc/A9QS-VLK8] (identifying for FTC mergers a trend toward unilateral effects analysis 
and increase in efficiency findings after 1994, although dropping for challenged mergers after 2004). 
 22 See, e.g., Background Note by the Secretariat, Algorithms and Collusion, OECD Doc. 
DAF/COMP(2017)4, at 17 (June 9, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2017)4/en/pdf 
[https://perma.cc/29VF-2RFT] (noting that tacit collusion “refers to forms of anti-competitive co-
ordination which can be achieved without any need for an explicit agreement, but which competitors 
are able to maintain by recognising their mutual interdependence. In a tacitly collusive context, the non-
competitive outcome is achieved by each participant deciding its own profit-maximising strategy 
independently of its competitors”); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 
209, 227 (1993) (describing “the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated 
market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, 
supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with 
respect to price and output decisions” and subsequently unilaterally set their prices above the 
competitive level); Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, OECD 
(1993), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF68-G4N5]. 
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have not acted independently from each other (the so-called, ‘meeting of 
the minds’).”23 
tacit collusion has taken another dimension with the proliferation of 
pricing algorithms. Many competition authorities recognize the risk that 
algorithms can facilitate and enhance tacit collusion. The OECD in 2016, 
for example, commented that these “strategies may pose serious challenges 
to competition authorities in the future, as it may be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to prove an intention to coordinate prices, at least using current 
antitrust tools.”24 With the industry-wide use of computer algorithms and 
artificial intelligence, the concern is that algorithmic tacit collusion can 
arise in markets where such collusion previously would have been unstable. 
The OECD in 2017 reached the following two conclusions: 
Firstly, algorithms are fundamentally affecting market conditions, resulting in 
high price transparency and high-frequency trading that allows companies to 
react fast and aggressively. These changes in digital markets, if taken to a 
certain extent, could make collusive strategies stable in virtually any market 
structure. Secondly, by providing companies with powerful automated 
mechanisms to monitor prices, implement common policies, send market 
signals or optimise joint profits with deep learning techniques, algorithms 
might enable firms to achieve the same outcomes of traditional hard core 
cartels through tacit collusion.25 
Similar concerns as to the possible use of algorithms to sustain tacit 
collusion have been raised by policy makers and competition agencies 
(among them, Germany, Italy, France, United Kingdom, Russia, Israel, and 
Australia).26 
 
 23 Background Note by the Secretariat, supra note 22, at 17. 
 24 Ania Thiemann & Pedro Gonzaga, OECD Competition Div., Background Note by the 
Secretariat, Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era, OECD Doc. 
DAF/COMP(2016)14 (Oct. 27, 2016), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2016)14/en/pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KL28-QS5D]. 
 25 Background Note by the Secretariat, supra note 22, at 49-50. 
 26 See e.g., Antonio Capobianco et al., OECD, Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the 
Digital Age, OECD (2017), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Algorithms-and-colllusion-
competition-policy-in-the-digital-age.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJ2C-AEZQ]; Press Release, 
Monopolkommission, supra note 4; Press Release, Autorité de la Concurrence [French Competition 
Authority] & Bundeskartellamt [German Federal Cartel Office], The French Autorité de la 
Concurrence and the German Bundeskartellamt Launch A Joint Project on Algorithms and Their 
Implications on Competition, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (Jun. 19, 2018) (Fr. & Ger.), 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2018/19_06_2018_A
lgorithmen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 [https://perma.cc/V7GL-LSWD]; Note from Italy, 
Algorithms and Collusion, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)18, at 2 (2 June 2017), https://one.
oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)18/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/66GU-ZUKV]; Competition 
and Mkt. Auth., Pricing algorithms: Economic Working Paper on the Use of Algorithms to Facilitate 
Collusion and Personalised Pricing 5 (CMA 94, 2018) (UK), https://assets.publishing.
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Algorithmic tacit collusion - that is, the use of algorithms to execute 
unilateral and rational reactions to market characteristics that reflect 
interdependence - will not affect every (or even most) markets. As Virtual 
Competition explores,27 one would expect to observe algorithmic tacit 
collusion in markets with several important characteristics: 
First, algorithmic tacit collusion likely would arise in concentrated 
markets involving homogenous products where the algorithms can monitor, 
to a sufficient degree, the competitors’ pricing, other keys terms of sale, 
and any deviations from the current equilibrium.28 Software may be used to 
report and take independent action when faced with a rival’s deviation, be 
it from the supra-competitive or recommended retail price. Conscious 
parallelism would be facilitated and stabilized to the extent (i) these the 
rivals’ reactions are predictable, or (ii) through repeated interactions, the 
firms’ pricing algorithms “could come to ‘decode’ each other, thus 
allowing each one to better anticipate the other’s reaction.”29 As the OECD 
observed, 
The increase of market transparency is not only a result of more data being 
available, but also of the ability of algorithms to make predictions and to 
reduce strategic uncertainty. Indeed, complex algorithms with powerful data 
mining capacity are in a better place to distinguish between intentional 
deviations from collusion and natural reactions to changes in market 
conditions or even mistakes, which may prevent unnecessary retaliations.30 
 
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/746353/Algorithms_econ_rep
ort.pdf (noting that “algorithmic pricing may be more likely to facilitate collusion in markets which are 
already susceptible to coordination, . . . For these ‘marginal’ markets, the increasing use of data and 
algorithmic pricing may be the ‘last piece of the puzzle’ that could allow suppliers to move to a 
coordinated equilibrium. There could also be greater scope for coordination where algorithmic pricing 
takes place in an online context where price monitoring and response can happen particularly 
quickly.”); SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 7, ¶¶ 178-79; Note by the Russian 
Federation, Algorithms and Collusion, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)22 (May 15, 2017), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)22/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/4CM2-SSK3]; 
Report by Israel, Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Israel, OECD Doc. DAF-
COMP-AR(2018)9 (May 2, 2018), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/AR(2018)9/en/pdf 
[ https://perma.cc/KCB9-PM94]; Rod Sims, Chairman, Australian Competition and Consumer Comm’n 
[ACCC], The ACCC’s Approach to Colluding Robots, Remarks at “Can robots collude?” Conference, 
ACCC (Nov. 16, 2017) (Austl.), https://www.accc.gov.au/speech/the-accc’s-approach-to-colluding-
robots [https://perma.cc/54GC-C3BZ]. 
 27 EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 6. 
 28 Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5, ¶ 41 [hereinafter EC Merger 
Guidelines]; Note from Singapore, Algorithms and Collusion, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)24, 
at 2 (May 31, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)24/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/
7HFV-AYTU]. 
 29 Note from the European Union, supra note 12, at 8. 
 30 Background Note by the Secretariat, supra note 22, at 20. 
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A second important market condition is that once deviation (e.g., 
discounting) is detected, a credible deterrent mechanism exists.31 Unique to 
an algorithmic environment is the speed of retaliation.32 Computers can 
rapidly detect deviations, and calculate the profit implications of a myriad 
of moves and counter-moves to punish deviations.33 The speed of 
calculated responses effectively deprives discounting rivals of any 
significant sales. The speed also means that the tacit collusion can be 
signalled in seconds. The greater the improbability that the first-mover will 
benefit from its discounting, the greater the likelihood of tacit collusion.34 
Thus, if each algorithm can swiftly match a rival’s discount and eliminate 
its incentive to discount in the first place, the threat of future retaliation 
keeps the coordination sustainable.35 Noteworthy are the European 
Commission’s observations in its 2015-16 e-commerce sector inquiry, 
About half of the retailers track online prices of competitors. In addition to 
easily accessible online searches and price comparison tools, both retailers and 
manufacturers report about the use of specific price monitoring software, often 
referred to as ‘spiders’, created either by third party software specialists or by 
the companies themselves. This software crawls the internet and gathers large 
amounts of price related information. 67% of those retailers that track online 
prices use (also) automatic software programmes for that purpose. Larger 
companies have a tendency to track online prices of competing retailers more 
than smaller ones . . . some software allows companies to monitor several 
hundred online shops extremely rapidly, if not in real time . . . Alert 
 
 31 EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 31; Note from the European Union, supra note 12, at 8 
(noting that “tacit collusion requires effective retaliation, which in turn requires spare capacity” as a 
“capacity-constrained firm cannot initiate a price war as a means of retaliation to enforce tacit 
collusion”). 
 32 But see EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 31, ¶ 53 (“The speed with which deterrent 
mechanisms can be implemented is related to the issue of transparency. If firms are only able to observe 
their competitors’ actions after a substantial delay, then retaliation will be similarly delayed and this 
may influence whether it is sufficient to deter deviation.”). 
 33 Jill Priluck, When Bots Collude, NEW YORKER (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/
business/currency/when-bots-collude [https://perma.cc/35D6-CMB4]. 
 34 Samuel B. Hwang & Sungho Kim, Dynamic Pricing Algorithm for E-Commerce, in ADVANCES 
IN SYSTEMS, COMPUTING SCIENCES AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 149-155 (Khaled Elleithy & Tarek 
Sobh eds., 2006); Naoki Abe & Tomonari Kamba, A Web Marketing System with Automatic Pricing, 33 
COMPUTER NETWORKS 775 (2000); Lusajo M. Minga et al., Dynamic Pricing: E-Commerce-Oriented 
Price Setting Algorithm, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2003 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MACHINE 
LEARNING AND CYBERNETICS 893 (2003). 
 35 Commission Decision of 20 December 2001 Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with 
the Common Market and the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2389 Shell/DEA), 2003 O.J. (L 15) 35, ¶ 
121 (“The retaliation mechanism must be sufficiently plausible and effective to counterbalance the 
existing degree of probability and incentives to deviate in the market situation of the individual case . . . 
If the parties take the view that retaliation is costly, then the cost of deviating by winning a contract in 
deviation from a coordinated pattern in the first place is very high, too, and reduces the likelihood of 
such action.”). 
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functionalities in price monitoring software allow companies to get alerted as 
soon as a retailer’s price is not in line with a predefined price.36 
In such an environment, deviation would likely be unprofitable. The 
algorithm, in maximizing profits, “would need to decide that it is a better 
course of action than competitive pricing, especially if competitive pricing 
leads to drastically larger sales volumes.”37 
A third condition is that “the reactions of outsiders, such as current 
and future competitors not participating in the coordination, as well as 
customers, should not be able to jeopardise the results expected from the 
coordination.”38 Thus, algorithmic tacit collusion will likely arise in 
concentrated markets where buyers cannot exert buyer power (or entice 
sellers to defect), sales transactions tend to be “frequent, regular, and 
relatively small,”39 and the market in general is characterized by high entry 
barriers. 
To be clear, no bright line exists of when an industry becomes 
sufficiently concentrated for either express or tacit collusion.40 Indeed, 
competition agencies often struggle in predicting when a merger may 
facilitate tacit collusion. In addition, it is important to stress that the above 
 
 36 Commission Staff Working Document: Preliminary Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry ¶¶ 
550-551, SWD(2016) 312 final (Sept. 15, 2016); Ecossistemas Digitais, Big Data e Algoritmos [Digital 
Ecosystems, Big Data and Algorithms], AUTORIDADE DA CONCORRENCIA [PORTUGUESE COMPETITION 
AUTH.] (July 2019), http://www.concorrencia.pt/vPT/Noticias_Eventos/Comunicados/Documents/
Issues%20Paper_%20Ecossistemas%20Digitais%20Big%20Data%20Algoritmos.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J3VC-JELK] (Portuguese competition authority finding that 37% of surveyed companies used specific 
software to track competitor prices, and of those 79% adjusted their prices in reaction to the information 
obtained through the algorithm). 
 37 Note by the European Union, supra note 12, at 8. As the OECD noted, “market stagnation 
characterised by declining demand and the existence of business cycles may hinder collusion. This is 
because firms have strong incentives to profitably deviate when demand is high and reducing the costs 
of retaliation in future periods when demand is low.” Background Note by the Secretariat, supra note 
22, at 20. 
 38 EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 31, ¶ 41. 
 39 U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 19 (Mar. 2006), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/801216/download 
[https://perma.cc/3ATK-FEEQ]. 
 40 Note, for example, research by Levenstein and Suslow, who offer several explanations for the 
lack of a clear empirical relationship between industry concentration and cartels involving express 
collusion: 
First, this ambiguity may reflect the bias introduced by focusing on cartels that were prosecuted 
by the U.S. Department of Justice; cartels with large numbers of firms or that had the active 
involvement of an industry association may have been more likely to get caught. Second, 
industries with a very small number of firms may be able to collude tacitly without resort to 
explicit collusion. Third, concentration is endogenous: collusion may have allowed more firms 
to survive and remain in the market. 
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 43, 58 (2006). 
17:217 (2020) Algorithmic Tacit Collusion 
229 
phenomenon will affect a select number of markets. Still, when the above 
three conditions are present, the risk of tacit collusion is greater. 
Importantly, the nature of electronic markets, the availability of data, 
and the adoption of similar algorithms by key providers will likely push 
some markets that were just outside the realm of tacit collusion into 
interdependence.41 Furthermore, in such circumstances, tacit collusion is 
likelier to be sustained over time. The market stability needed for tacit 
collusion (that is, the absence of significant price deviations from the 
tacitly collusive price) is enhanced by the fact that computer algorithms are 
unlikely to exhibit human biases.42 Human biases, of course, may be 
reflected in the programming code. But biases will not necessarily affect 
decisions on a case-by-case basis: a computer does not fear detection and 
possible financial penalties or incarceration; nor does it respond in anger.43 
Once programmed to execute a certain pricing policy, the computer will 
follow the plan. “We’re talking about a velocity of decision-making that 
isn’t really human,” said Terrell McSweeny, a former Commissioner with 
the US Federal Trade Commission. “All of the economic models are based 
on human incentives and what we think humans rationally will do. It’s 
entirely possible that not all of that learning is necessarily applicable in 
some of these markets.”44 
 
Looking at the market for pricing algorithms, one can see software 
vendors who are currently promoting their price optimization algorithms as 
a way to avoid price wars and increase prices and margins. Boomerang, for 
example, promotes how its price optimization software can “put an end to 
price wars before they even begin.”45 As the Italian competition authority 
 
 41 One would expect tacit collusion to be feasible with a larger number of participants than 
commonly assumed. On the common market assumptions, see generally Reinhard Selten, A Simple 
Model of Imperfect Competition, Where Four Are Few and Six Are Many, 2 INT’L J. GAME THEORY 141 
(1973); Steffen Huck et al., Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in Experimental 
Oligopolies’, 53(4) J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 435 (2004). 
 42 EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 31, ¶ 44 (observing that “[c]oordination is more likely to 
emerge if competitors can easily arrive at a common perception as to how the coordination should 
work. Coordinating firms should have similar views regarding which actions would be considered to be 
in accordance with the aligned behaviour and which actions would not.”); Note from Singapore, supra 
note 28, at 2. 
 43 Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How Pricing Bots Could Form Cartels and Make Things 
More Expensive, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 27, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/how-pricing-bots-could-
form-cartels-and-make-things-more-expensive [https://perma.cc/D946-EMMP]. 
 44 David Lynch, Policing the Digital Cartels, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.pros.com/
about-pros/news/financial-times-policing-digital-cartels/ [https://perma.cc/M49X-F9SW]. 
 45 Abhijeet Sathe, How Retailers and Brands Can Avoid the Race to the Bottom in Online Pricing, 
INTERNET RETAILER (July 9, 2018), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/2018/07/09/how-retailers-
and-brands-can-avoid-the-race-to-the-bottom-in-online-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/3YDF-EZXY]. 
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observed, “a number of specialized software developers offer solutions that 
allow even small companies to implement ‘strategic’ dynamic pricing 
strategies, offering tools to ‘auto-detect pricing wars’ as well as to ‘help 
drive prices back up across all competition.’”46 
Ultimately, we may see more instances in which similar pricing is not 
the result of fierce competition, nor the result of cartel activity, but rather 
the result of algorithmic tacit collusion. In those affected markets, one may 
witness the same result as express collusion, namely higher prices, with 
antitrust enforcers powerless to intervene. 
II. THE (IN)STABILITY OF TACIT COLLUSION ABSENT COMMUNICATION 
Algorithmic tacit collusion does not pervade the entire digital 
economy. It will likely only arise in markets with the characteristics 
discussed in Part I. Some critics, however, have questioned the likelihood 
of sustainable algorithmic tacit collusion even in these markets. As we 
explain below, their arguments, however, have failed to persuade enforcers 
and courts with respect to tacit collusion in the brick-and-mortar economy. 
Nor are they likely to gain traction in the digital economy. 
In discounting the possibility of tacit collusion—whether by humans 
or algorithms—several economists point to earlier scholarship, which 
highlights the important role of communications in stabilizing and 
optimizing collusion.47 They argue that while collusion without 
communication may be possible, it is highly unlikely. To their minds, the 
increase in transparency, speed in retaliation, and frequency in contacts are 
insufficient, even under the three market conditions outlined in Part I. 
According to this view, markets with more than two companies need some 
kind of explicit coordination (like communications) to enter into and 
sustain collusion. In extending the consensus that communication facilitates 
alignment (the exact level of communication needed remains unclear),48 
and that complex market realities would make collusion and tacit collusion 
difficult,49 they argue that absent communication, tacit collusion is unlikely. 
Their argument is that “firms are unlikely to develop a mutual 
 
 46 Note from Italy, supra note 26, at 3. 
 47 See Kühn & Tadelis, supra note 16; Schwalbe, supra note 16. 
 48 Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication Between Firms, 16 
ECON. POL’Y 167 (2001); Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishnay, On Tacit Versus Explicit Collusion (November 
3, 2014) (unpublished working paper, Pennsylvania State University), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2518707 [https://perma.cc/X647-778Y]. 
 49 For instance, where the environment is dynamic, demand is uncertain, and competition is not 
limited to price. See Edward Green et al., Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly, 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK INT’L 
ANTITRUST ECON. 464-97 (2014). 
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understanding over a collusive strategy absent direct communication in the 
initiation phase.”50 
According to this view, even in simple markets that exhibit the 
characteristics outlined in Part I, a coordination problem exists in markets 
with more than two rivals.51 Accordingly, to increase the likelihood of 
stable tacit collusion, one would require some form of communication 
either to kickstart or sustain the collusion.52 
The issue is principal and goes beyond the discussion of algorithmic 
collusion. This body of scholarship suggests that, many times, tacit 
coordination is unlikely absent some form of illicit communication or 
centralized orchestration, even in markets with three rivals.53 These 
findings are often based on empirical observations under laboratory 
conditions with perfect control and transparency over communications. 
Permitting the human subjects to communicate, even briefly, increased 
their ability to enter into and sustain coordination, and higher prices with 
higher numbers of participants. Absent communications, collusion in these 
experiments was difficult, if not impossible, to reach and sustain. 
If one accepts this claim, the unavoidable need for communication 
among firms would bring the parallel behavior into the realm of antitrust 
enforcement and enable agencies to condemn it as an anticompetitive 
agreement or concerted practice under well-established case law. Thus, if 
algorithms do not (or cannot) “communicate” with one another, then 
algorithmic tacit collusion is unlikely.54 Thus, when we observe what 
appears to be tacit collusion in these markets, it is likely the result of illegal 
human communications. 
 
 50 David P. Byrne & Nicolas de Roos, Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline, 109 
AM. ECON. REV. 591 (2019) (noting, but not necessarily agreeing, with economic theories of collusion 
that “presume collusive agreements are initiated through explicit communication or remaining agnostic 
as to how such an understanding emerges”). 
 51 This is so, since the number of collusive equilibria present in a repeated game defies the simple 
alignment of prices. On the role of communications, see Joseph E. Harrington et al., The Relative 
Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings, 
128 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 251 (2016); Miguel A. Fonseca & Hans-Theo Normann, Explicit vs. 
Tacit Collusion–The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments, 56 EUR. ECON. REV. 1759 
(2011); David J. Cooper & Kai-Uwe Kühn, Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for 
Collusion, 6 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 247 (2016); Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap 
Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 103 (1996); Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic Information 
Transmission, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1431 (1982). 
 52 Independent of the discussion here, it has been shown that after a period of collusion supported 
by regular communication, firms are able to maintain collusive prices even when communication is no 
longer possible. See Fonseca & Normann, supra note 51. 
 53 See, e.g., Schwalbe, supra note 16. 
 54 Indeed, the degree of coordination required to align the algorithms would increase the risk of 
exposure and civil (and potentially criminal) liability. 
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So why have these criticisms failed to persuade enforcers and courts 
with respect to tacit collusion in the brick-and-mortar economy, and why 
are they unlikely to gain traction in the digital economy? 
When competition agencies or courts observe conscious parallelism 
that yields supra-competitive pricing, they do not assume that the 
competitors must be communicating with each other to jump-start or 
sustain the tacit collusion. As we illustrate below, the law in both the US 
and EU recognizes that, under certain market conditions, companies can 
behave as rational agents and adjust to market characteristics without any 
communications. The classic example is one gas station in a remote town 
silently reacting to the pricing of its competitors across the street.55 As 
courts note, “One does not need an agreement to bring about this kind of 
follow-the-leader effect in a concentrated industry.”56 Such phenomenon, 
while dampening price competition, is legal and will not trigger 
intervention. As the US Supreme Court held: 
Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious 
parallelism, describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a 
concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their 
prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their 
shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and 
output decisions.57 
Both EU and US antitrust law recognizes that anticompetitive 
“behavior can sometimes be coordinated without any communication or 
other observable and reprehensible behavior.”58 That is why “[t]acit 
coordination is feared by antitrust policy even more than express collusion, 
for tacit coordination, even when observed, cannot easily be controlled 
directly by the antitrust laws.”59 In recognizing this possibility, antitrust 
plaintiffs in the EU and US can only attack this tacit collusion indirectly.60 
 
 55 In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 231, 250 (D. Mass. 2014), aff’d, 
842 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting how “[g]as stations in a geographically isolated region, for example, 
are likely to engage in parallel supracompetitive pricing behavior because each gas station understands 
that matching the highest price in the region encourages prices to stay uniformly high without hurting 
demand, and that all local competitors are likely to independently reach the same conclusion.”). 
 56 See id. (quoting Clamp–All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
 57 Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) (citations 
omitted); see also F.T.C. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 58 CITY OF COLUMBIA V. OMNI OUTDOOR ADVERT., INC., 499 U.S. 365, 396 N. 10 (1991) 
(QUOTING 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1400, AT 3-4 (REV. ED. 1986)). 
 59 Heinz, 246 F.3d at 725 (quoting 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 901b2, at 9 
(rev. ed. 1998)). 
 60 Heinz, 246 F.3d at 725; Max Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, 78 
ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 134–35 (2012) (“Consciously parallel conduct does not provide a basis for Section 
1 liability under the current state of the law, but the potential for conscious parallelism is relevant to 
17:217 (2020) Algorithmic Tacit Collusion 
233 
One way is for the US Federal Trade Commission to attack practices that 
facilitate tacit collusion under its broader powers under Section 5 of the 
FTC Act, which it hasn’t actively pursued in the past few decades.61 
Another way is to target mergers that foster tacit collusion, precisely 
because this behavior, which can be accomplished without any 
communications or agreement among rivals, is otherwise difficult to 
prosecute.62 
With the above in mind, we observe a gap between the law and the 
criticism according to which, communication is needed to enter into or 
stabilize conscious parallelism, and industry awareness will not suffice to 
support a common strategy. The law posits that anticompetitive parallel 
behavior among a few firms can naturally occur in markets with the 
conditions outlined in Part I. Indeed, it can occur with sufficient frequency 
in these markets that the law will not presume any underlying 
communications. For if the courts believed that communications often 
accompanied conscious parallelism, a legal presumption would likely 
arise.63 
This notion affects both ex ante merger review and ex post antitrust 
enforcement. In the case of merger review, the realization that tacit 
collusion may emerge when the market conditions in Part I are present will 
justify careful scrutiny of proposed transactions that would foster conscious 
 
merger review under Clayton Act Section 7, and there have been calls for FTC Act Section 5 
enforcement against conscious parallelism.”). 
 61 Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Toward A Dynamic Antitrust Analysis of Strategic Market Behavior, 47 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101, 117 (2003); Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The 
Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1390 n. 31 (1998) (“The high (or low) 
point of FTC enforcement of Section 5 of the FTC Act challenging tacit collusion and oligopoly came 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s in three unsuccessful cases against the oil, fuel additives, and cereal 
industries. The oil investigation was eventually dropped after years of investigation. The FTC lost the 
other two matters. See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); In re 
Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982).”). 
 62 Heinz, 246 F.3d at 725 (quoting 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. 
SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 901b2, at 9 (rev. ed. 1998)) (“It is a central object of merger policy to 
obstruct the creation or reinforcement by merger of such oligopolistic market structures in which tacit 
coordination can occur.”); FTC Commissioner McSweeny: FTC Must Use All Available Tools to 
Evaluate Mergers, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW LEGAL UPDATE W-000-6233 (Sept. 30, 2015) 
(“Commissioner McSweeny explained that because antitrust enforcers can do little to remedy conscious 
parallelism and other forms of coordination in an already concentrated market, they should use the 
coordinated effects theory to predict and potentially prevent tacit collusion. Commissioner McSweeny 
noted that the guidelines allow agencies to challenge mergers without specific evidence of how 
potential coordination would manifest, and listed market factors that may link higher concentration with 
an increased risk of coordination, including: ease of entry or expansion; product homogeneity; market 
elasticity; customer switching costs; contract duration; transaction transparency.”). 
 63 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) (“Legal 
presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally 
disfavored in antitrust law.”). 
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parallelism. In the case of ex-post antitrust enforcement, the realization that 
tacit collusion may emerge when market conditions are present may 
provide an explanation to the parallel conduct and bring it outside the scope 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Article 101 of the EU’s TFEU. 
Accordingly, even when private plaintiffs, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), or European agencies have ample evidence of anticompetitive 
parallel behavior, that in itself, will not serve as proof of an agreement or 
illicit concerted practice, when the market conditions for tacit collusion are 
present.64 Courts instead will assume that tacit collusion is likely and will 
require additional proof, which often include evidence of illicit 
communication.65 It is only when parallel behavior cannot be explained as 
the outcome of tacit collusion (or due to other factors), that it may serve as 
proof of illegal collusion. As the European Court of Justice held: 
Although parallel behaviour may not by itself be identified with a concerted 
practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it 
leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal 
conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of the products, the size 
and number of the undertakings, and the volume of the said market.66 
It is for the competition agency and private plaintiff to establish that 
no other explanation for the parallel behavior is present, which is difficult 
to prove in oligopolistic markets.67 This is because the market may display 
the conditions for tacit collusion which can explain the parallel behavior. 
And so, the case law puts the onus on the antitrust plaintiff to prove the 
implausibility of rational unilateral reaction to market characteristics.68 But 
 
 64 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (“The inadequacy of showing 
parallel conduct or interdependence, without more, mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent 
with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business 
strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.”); Harlem River Consumers Co-
op., Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 1251, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“It is well 
established that consciously parallel business behavior does not of itself constitute a violation of the 
antitrust laws.”). 
 65 See, e.g., In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 398 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(“[E]vidence of conscious parallelism cannot alone create a reasonable inference of a conspiracy,” so in 
order to “move the ball across the goal line, a plaintiff must also show that certain plus factors are 
present,” as these “plus factors are ‘proxies for direct evidence’ because they ‘tend to ensure that courts 
punish concerted action—an actual agreement—instead of the unilateral, independent conduct of 
competitors.’” The court highlighted “traditional non-economic evidence of a conspiracy as the most 
important plus factor,” which looks for “proof that the defendants got together and exchanged 
assurances of common action or otherwise adopted a common plan even though no meetings, 
conversations, or exchanged documents are shown.”). 
 66 Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1972 E.C.R. 619, 655. 
 67 See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360-61 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 68 See, e.g., Case T‑442/08, CISAC v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2013:188, ¶182 (2013). 
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the “most important evidence will generally be non-economic evidence that 
there was an actual, manifest agreement not to compete.”69 
One example is CISAC v. Commission where the European General 
Court quashed a finding by the European Commission that parallel 
behavior between collecting societies was the result of illegal collusion 
with the aim of dividing the market.70 The Court held that the Commission 
did not establish the requisite legal standard of the existence of collusion 
between the collecting societies to fix the national territorial limitations. 
The evidence relied upon by the Commission was not sufficient to render 
implausible the explanation that the national territorial limitations were the 
result of individual, carefully considered, and rational decisions, given the 
specific conditions of the market and not the result of a concerted 
practice.71 The Court held that “the Commission must show precise and 
consistent evidence in order to establish the existence of the 
infringement.”72 Indeed, it is settled case law that “where the Commission’s 
reasoning is based on the supposition that the facts established in its 
decision cannot be explained other than by concentration between the 
undertakings, it is sufficient for the applicants to prove circumstances 
which cast the facts established by the Commission in a different light and 
thus allow another explanation of the facts to be substituted for the one 
adopted by the Commission.”73 
Thus, the case law accepts that absent proof of express collusion or 
communication, parallel action and tacit collusion may be the only 
explanation of the market outcome.74 Consumers may be harmed by the 
 
 69 In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d at 361 (citations omitted). 
 70 Case T‑442/08, CISAC v Comm’n, 5 C.M.L.R. 15 (2013). 
 71 Id. ¶ 95. 
 72 Id. ¶ 96. 
 73 Id. ¶ 99. 
 74 See, e.g., Washington Cty. Health Care Auth., Inc. v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 328 F. Supp. 3d 824, 832 
(N.D. Ill. 2018). The court stated: 
For several reasons, the probative force of plaintiffs’ allegations of parallel conduct is 
particularly weak. Chief among them is that the IV saline market is an oligopoly in which 
“conscious parallelism”—”a common reaction of firms in a concentrated market that recognize 
their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output 
decisions”—is to be expected. In other words, absent additional factual allegations, the mere 
fact that Baxter and Hospira restricted their own production of IV saline solution output after 
learning of output reductions by the other sheds little light on the existence vel non of an 
unlawful agreement. Yes, it is possible that Baxter and Hospira’s behavior stemmed from a 
violation of the antitrust laws—i.e., that it was the result of an agreement. But the nature of an 
oligopoly makes it such that there is a substantial likelihood that—even absent an agreement—
Baxter and Hospira would have tried to capitalize on output restrictions signaled by the other, as 
it was in their independent interests to restrict supply and drive up prices. In short, parallel 
conduct in an oligopolistic market is not particularly probative of collusion. 
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higher prices, yet the law cannot condemn the parallelism as illegal.75 In 
other words, the courts and agencies accept that tacit collusion is not only 
legal, but likely and sustainable in concentrated industries. Absent proof of 
an agreement, the plaintiff cannot challenge the anticompetitive conduct. 
In an interesting case from 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit explored price alignment without any actual communications 
among the parties. The opinion is noteworthy as its author, Judge Richard 
Posner, in his earlier writings, thought that it was “improbable that prices 
could long be maintained above cost in a market, even a highly 
oligopolistic one, without some explicit acts of communication and 
implementation.”76 
Nonetheless, writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner accepted 
the notion that anticompetitive tacit collusion can occur without any such 
communication: 
As for the apparent anomaly of competitors’ raising prices in the face of 
falling costs, that is indeed evidence that they are not competing in the sense 
of trying to take sales from each other. However, this may be not because 
they’ve agreed not to compete but because all of them have determined 
independently that they may be better off with a higher price. That higher 
price, moreover—the consequence of parallel but independent decisions to 
raise prices—may generate even greater profits (compared to competitive 
pricing) if costs are falling, provided that consumers do not have attractive 
alternatives.77 
In this case, the action taken by the companies was deemed unilateral 
and reflected an economic rationale, in light of each firm’s demand 
function.78 The Seventh Circuit recognized that anti-competitive pricing 
could arise from purely tacit collusion: “There isn’t even evidence that [an 
 
Id. (citations omitted). See also Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1972 E.C.R. 
619, ¶ 8 (“Although parallel behaviour may not by itself be identified with a concerted practice, it may 
however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it leads to conditions of competition which do 
not correspond to the normal conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of the products, the 
size and number of the undertakings, and the volume of the said market.”). 
 75 See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350,360 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting how the 
Supreme Court has described conscious parallelism in dicta as “the process, not in itself unlawful, by 
which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a 
profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their 
interdependence with respect to price and output decisions.”). 
 76 Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 
1562, 1574 (1969). 
 77 In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 871-72 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 78 Id. at 876. 
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employee of the defendant] had ever communicated on any subject with 
any employee of any of the other defendants.”79 As the court noted, 
[T]he Sherman Act imposes no duty on firms to compete vigorously, or for 
that matter at all, in price. This troubles some antitrust experts, such as 
Harvard Law School Professor Louis Kaplow, whose book Competition 
Policy and Price Fixing (2013) argues that tacit collusion should be deemed a 
violation of the Sherman Act. That of course is not the law, and probably 
shouldn’t be. A seller must decide on a price; and if tacit collusion is 
forbidden, how does a seller in a market in which conditions (such as few 
sellers, many buyers, and a homogeneous product, which may preclude 
nonprice competition) favor convergence by the sellers on a joint profit-
maximizing price without their actually agreeing to charge that price, decide 
what price to charge?80 
The courts assume that “[c]ompetitors in concentrated markets watch 
each other like hawks.”81 Each competitor will copy or respond to 
competitive responses without necessarily communicating with one 
another. And “it is not a violation of antitrust law for a firm to raise its 
price, counting on its competitors to do likewise (but without any 
communication with them on the subject) and fearing the consequences if 
they do not.”82 
How does one reconcile the views of the courts and enforcers on the 
one hand and the discrete subset of economists on the other hand? 
One explanation is that the case law is simply wrong. Tacit collusion 
is unlikely and communications are occurring, but the colluders are 
effectively covering their tracks. We are presented with a case of a Type II 
error (false negative) where courts are dismissing cases when they should 
be finding liability. 
For example, in the Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, the parties 
were embroiled in three years of discovery, culminating in the district 
judge’s grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.83 The heart 
of the plaintiffs’ case were two emails between two T-Mobile executives. 
In the first e-mail, the executive writes, “Gotta tell you but my gut says 
raising messaging pricing again is nothing more than a price gouge on 
consumers. I would guess that consumer advocates groups are going to 
come after us at some point. It’s not like we’ve had an increase in the cost 
to carry message to justify this or a drop in our subscription SOC rates? I 
 
 79 Id. at 873. 
 80 Id. at 873-74. 
 81 Id. at 875. 
 82 Id. at 876. 
 83 Id. at 869. 
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know the other guys are doing it but that doesn’t mean we have to 
follow.”84 The second e-mail -- sent in the wake of a congressional 
investigation of alleged price gouging by the defendants – noted said that 
“at the end of the day we know there is no higher cost associated with 
messaging. The move [the latest price increase by T–Mobile] was colusive 
[sic] and opportunistic.”85 Judge Posner summarily disposed of this 
“smoking gun” evidence: 
the plaintiffs’ counsel demonstrate a failure to understand the fundamental 
distinction between express and tacit collusion. Express collusion violates 
antitrust law; tacit collusion does not. There is nothing to suggest that [the T-
Mobile executive] was referring to (or accusing his company of) express 
collusion. In fact the first email rather clearly refers to tacit collusion[.]86 
While some economists doubt the ability to enter and sustain 
conscious parallelism,87 the law assumes that it is possible without illicit 
communication and does not intervene. 
The problem is that if one were to reject the prevailing legal 
viewpoint, we may quickly shift to a Type I error (false positive), where 
courts reach a positive result (finding the defendants liable for price-fixing) 
when they should reach a negative one (finding the defendants not liable 
because they never agreed with one another). All the plaintiff would have 
to show in markets with more than two competitors is an anticompetitive 
outcome – whether by tacit or express collusion. If anticompetitive 
conscious parallelism/tacit collusion is considered implausible without 
communication, the court would infer communications among the 
competitors. Once the court makes this inference, it is a small step to infer 
from the unobserved communications -- along with the observed 
anticompetitive behavior – an agreement among the rivals, and thus 
liability under EU and US law. Under such approach, the distinction 
between express and tacit collusion would fade as the agencies, antitrust 
plaintiffs, and courts would assume an illegal agreement whenever 
observing conscious parallelism with anticompetitive outcomes.88 This, of 
 
 84 Id. at 872. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Schwalbe, supra note 16; Schrepel, supra note 16; Kühn & Tadelis, supra note 16; 
Transcript of FTC Hearings Session No. 7: Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century - 
Day 1, supra note 16; Transcript of FTC Hearings Session No. 7: Competition and Consumer 
Protection in the 21st Century - Day 2, supra note 9. 
 88 One potential rebuttal is that the antitrust plaintiffs should still have to hunt for evidence of the 
communications. But why? When there is fire, why would the court require plaintiffs to prove 
independently the existence of smoke? If what you are observing—namely the anticompetitive 
coordination—is only possible with communications, then why would the courts require the plaintiff to 
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course, would send shivers down the defense bar’s and their clients’ spines. 
Courts would presume that firms communicated, even when they have not. 
And how would they prove that they did not communicate? To avoid 
prosecution, firms will be required to operate irrationally in the market. 
A second explanation focuses on the misalignment between market 
realities and the experimental evidence upon which some economists rely. 
According to this explanation, economic experiments, carried in 
laboratories with test subjects that interact over a period of a few hours 
(and with absolute control over communications), do not necessarily 
provide a good proxy for actual market behavior where awareness of 
interdependence exists absent illicit communications. The lab experiments 
do not reflect the interdependence of tacit collusion (and often discount the 
stability of actual collusion). In practice, firms can sustain tacit collusion 
without illicit communication as they operate with awareness that develops 
over time, as to the market dynamics, and the benefit they may attain from 
parallelism and the avoidance of price wars. Firms that operate over long 
periods of time in these highly concentrated markets benefit from “industry 
awareness” and understand the interdependence among their actions.89 That 
awareness emerges from a large number of abstract signals and 
observations, none of which triggers antitrust intervention, and can reduce 
uncertainty about future actions with long-lasting effects on coordination. 
This awareness may substitute communication in a laboratory setting and, 
at the very least, provide a plausible explanation to the durable conscious 
parallelism. 
Whichever explanation one favors, either way – when determining 
illegality – the law rejects the argument that communication is essential to 
establish tacit collusion. Quite the contrary, the law accepts that when 
market conditions for tacit collusion are present, conscious parallelism 
yielding anticompetitive outcomes may be sustained. Put simply, tacit 
coordination can exist “without any actual communication among 
competitors.”90 
 
expend time and resources to prove the communication? In the end, tacit collusion would always violate 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Article 101 of TFEU. 
 89 See, e.g., Rumina Dhalla & Christine Oliver, Industry Identity in an Oligopolistic Market and 
Firms’ Responses to Institutional Pressures, 34 ORG. STUD. 1803 (2013); Margaret Peteraf & Mark 
Shanley, Getting to Know You: A Theory of Strategic Group Identity, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 165 
(1997). 
 90 U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comment on Proposed Confidentiality Determinations for Data 
Required Under the Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule and Proposed Amendment to Special 
Rules Governing Certain Information Obtained Under the Clean Air Act (September 30, 2010), 2010 
WL 9440202, at *6 n.3; In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d. 651, 654 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (noting that a tacit agreement to fix prices is “an agreement made without any actual 
communication among the parties to the agreement”). 
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Returning to our discussion of algorithms, the same legal approach 
applies. When we raised our scenarios of algorithmic tacit collusion, most 
enforcers, judges, and lawyers recognized this possibility. It derived 
naturally from the law and market reality that they encountered over the 
decades. Moreover, other economists and game theorists accept tacit 
collusion without communications.91 But, if one assumes that the skeptics 
are right, then the gap between their beliefs and the law has widened. If the 
skeptics are right, humans have somehow successfully skirted antitrust 
liability for decades by convincing enforcers that parallel behavior can 
naturally occur under some market conditions and is not the result of illicit 
communications. But because pricing algorithms cannot engage in this 
“stealth communication,” algorithmic tacit collusion should be impossible. 
If true, then whenever enforcers observe what appears to be conscious 
parallelism in markets dominated by pricing algorithms, they have a 
stronger case to argue that the humans must have communicated. For any 
other explanation is impossible. But the enforcers and courts, to date, have 
not adopted this presumption. They recognize the possibility that humans 
may engage in illicit communication to limit competition (in which case 
they will prosecute them for cartel activity), but also recognize humans and 
algorithms may react unilaterally to market dynamics and tacitly collude 
without explicit (and illicit) communications. 
Another anomaly emerges. If the critics are correct, in industries 
conducive to tacit collusion, firms would have little, if any, incentive to use 
pricing algorithms. These firms apparently have a golden ticket – they can 
charge supra-competitive prices through stealth human communications 
without the threat of antitrust liability. So, one would not expect industries 
characterized by such tacit collusion – like gas stations – to switch to 
pricing algorithms. For if they did, their prices and profits, without the 
stealth human communications, would likely drop. If the prices don’t drop, 
then one must assume, under this economic theory, that the firms, as in the 
Topkins case in the US92 and the Trod and GBE cases in the UK,93 not only 
 
 91 See Marc Ivaldi et al., The Economics of Tacit Collusion - Final Report for Directorate General 
for Competition, European Commission (Mar. 2003), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/
studies_reports/the_economics_of_tacit_collusion_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3CS-JYKL]; see generally 
6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (3d ed. 2010); FREDERIC SCHERER & 
DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed.1990). 
 92 Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Topkins, No. CR 15-00201 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (pleading 
guilty to agreeing with his co-conspirators to fix the prices of certain posters sold in the United States 
through Amazon Marketplace, where the conspirators used specific pricing algorithms to implement 
their illegal oral agreement). 
 93 The UK antitrust authority found in 2016 that Trod Ltd. and GB eye Ltd. infringed the 
competition law by agreeing that they would not, in certain specified circumstances, undercut each 
other’s prices for posters and frames sold on Amazon’s UK website, and used pricing algorithms to 
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agreed to collude, but also communicated with each regarding the 
algorithms needed to implement and sustain their collusion. Thus, the level 
of communications between competitors should significantly increase as 
firms switch to pricing algorithms. 
Thus, courts and competition authorities have largely marginalized the 
“tacit collusion is impossible without communications” arguments. Indeed, 
as we discuss below, the emerging evidence justifies the courts’ and 
agencies’ skepticism of the skeptics. 
III. THE (IM)PLAUSIBILITY OF ALGORITHMIC TACIT COLLUSION 
Let us now move to a second, related issue which merits our attention 
– whether pricing algorithms can support anticompetitive conscious 
parallelism. If we accept the legal premise that conscious parallelism can 
occur without the communications that expose firms to antitrust liability, 
then the issue is whether algorithms can facilitate tacit collusion, and do so, 
in a superior manner to that of humans. 
Some contend that even if tacit collusion without communication were 
possible in the brick-and-mortar economy when rivals watch each other 
like hawks, and react to each other’s pricing and competitive moves, that 
does not mean it is possible in industries where prices are set by algorithms 
(and perhaps for some firms by humans). The potentially large number of 
pricing options presented by algorithms creates complexity, which will 
likely decrease the likelihood of alignment in a repeated game – that is, 
algorithms will unlikely obtain and sustain tacit collusion. In what follows, 
we consider this argument. 
Let us start by stating the obvious. This discussion does not concern 
“the rise of the machines” nor the creation of “evil” algorithms that seek to 
profit at the expense of consumers. It is a somewhat less exciting debate 
about the possibility that human-designed algorithms might offer a superior 
instrument for the optimization of pricing decisions, in markets that may 
support conscious parallelism. In that respect, one should note the limits of 
the pricing algorithm. It will not necessarily change the basic 
characteristics of every market, nor will it overcome instability that results 
from lower barriers to entry, maverick companies, or fierce competition. 
The tool at hand, at times, will amplify the power to monitor and punish in 
instances when humans see a benefit in sustaining parallel behavior. 
When discussing the extension of human will, it is helpful to 
distinguish between “simple” adaptive algorithms that are programmed to 
 
facilitate their illegal agreement. See U.K. Competition & Mkts. Auth., CMA Issues Final Decision in 
Online Cartel Case, GOV.UK (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-issues-
final-decision-in-online-cartel-case [https://perma.cc/U9GU-73MG]. 
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monitor and “react,” and more sophisticated self-learning algorithms that 
rely on artificial intelligence to autonomously determine the optimal 
strategy. That simplified distinction is of value for our discussion, as it 
helps identify instances in which the executives appreciated how their use 
of pricing algorithms would very likely foster conscious parallelism (thus, 
we have evidence of anticompetitive intent, but not necessarily 
communications), and instances in which humans do not intend to facilitate 
conscious parallelism through their use of algorithms. Let us explore both 
categories. 
A. Simple Algorithms 
Humans can program adaptive algorithms to reflect a pricing strategy 
that assumes interdependence on the market or is geared to push toward 
such interdependence. Humans observe the market dynamics and identify 
the desirability of parallelism. They subsequently program the algorithm to 
reflect the unilateral actions of a rational agent in this tight oligopoly. 
Detection and punishment of deviation are imbedded into the algorithmic 
pricing decision-making, in addition to the upward price adjustment that 
follows the price leader. 
In essence, tacit collusion happens at the human level and leads 
humans to utilize technology in order to stabilize it. As we saw in Part II, 
the law in the US and EU accepts that when market conditions are apt, such 
conscious parallelism can be established unilaterally, as humans develop an 
awareness of market dynamics and appreciate the interdependence among 
the rivals. As a result, the enforcers (other than the FTC) and private 
plaintiffs cannot legally challenge the new equilibrium (absent evidence of 
express collusion). The FTC can attempt to reach the industry-wide use 
algorithms as a facilitating practice. 
However, how likely is algorithmic tacit collusion without 
communications? To test the dynamic described above, let us start in the 
lab. Professors Nan Zhou, Li Zhang, Shijian Li, and Zhijian Wang devised 
a Linear Extortion to Collusion Algorithm (LECA) which can “enforce its 
human rival to collude.”94 Professors Nan Zhou and his colleagues then 
designed an algorithm-human game, where a human competed against the 
LECA algorithm for 600 rounds.95 In each round, the human and algorithm 
could decide the quantity of a product to produce. Importantly, for our 
purposes, they could not otherwise communicate with each other, nor did 
 
 94 Nan Zhou et al., Algorithmic Collusion in Cournot Duopoly Market: Evidence from 
Experimental Economics (Feb. 21, 2018) (unpublished working paper, Zhejiang University), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.08061.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DHQ-MDBP]. 
 95 Id. 
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the human know of the algorithm’s pricing strategy. After they each select 
a quantity of products they wanted to produce, they were told the human 
subject’s and algorithm’s profits. Over the first 300 iterations of the 
competition game, the humans learned that reducing quantity to reach the 
almost fully collusive level would secure the greatest profits. After learning 
this, the humans kept their quantity at the collusive level thereafter. In their 
Algorithm-Human duopoly market, the degree of tacit collusion rose to 
nearly 100% in rounds 300 to 400. What is interesting is that the time to 
establish tacit collusion (about 400 rounds) in the algorithm-human 
experiment was far quicker than in the human-human collusion (about 800 
rounds) experiments. Using an algorithm that is programed to achieve 
conscious parallelism resulted in a superior result than leaving that task to 
humans. From their experiments, the study’s authors concluded that first, 
algorithms can facilitate tacit collusion more quickly, and second, there 
exists incentives for firms to use such algorithms in the market. 
That experiment, as the authors recognized, involved a duopoly. Now 
let us consider tacit collusion in markets with multiple competitors. 
Suppose an oligopolistic gas station market with limited transparency, 
such that prices are only visible when reaching each gas station. In this 
market, customers can mitigate the search costs by asking friends about any 
available deals, visit a few gas stations, and support the station with the 
lowest price. Here a gas station, by discounting, may increase its profits 
and develop a reputation for having a low (if not, the lowest) price. At 
times, competitors, aware of the price reductions and promotions would 
respond with their own initiative. Even when the gas prices are more 
transparent, there is a lag for rivals to discover the lower price, because of 
monitoring time and costs. Their delayed response is likely to benefit the 
station with the reputation as a discounter. Under these market conditions, 
conscious parallelism is harder to sustain. The firms will likely compete as 
expected. We see here how markets “need to be sufficiently transparent to 
allow the coordinating firms to monitor to a sufficient degree whether other 
firms are deviating, and thus, know when to retaliate.”96 This would 
especially be the case where customers are aware of the price, while 
competitors do not (for example, when there are significant and frequent 
discounts). 
When transparency and the rivals’ speed in responding to competitive 
behavior increase in concentrated markets with homogeneous goods, so too 
does the risk of tacit collusion. With computerized pricing, the process may 
be faster and more stable. To foster parallelism, companies may adopt a 
 
 96 EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 31, ¶ 49. 
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pricing strategy that would be easy to decipher by competitors. Let us 
briefly illustrate with two examples. 
First, in 2012, petrol stations in Chile were required to post their fuel 
prices on a government website and to keep prices updated as they changed 
at the pump. An economic study found that this Chilean regulation did not 
increase competition.97 On the contrary, the petrol stations’ margins 
increased by 10%, on average, following the prices being posted on the 
government website.98 
Second, in Germany, the government suspected that an oligopoly of 
five firms -- BP (Aral), ConocoPhillips (Jet), ExxonMobil (Esso), Shell, 
and Total – dominated the off-motorway petrol station business.99 To 
promote competition, the government required the petrol stations to report 
to its government’s transparency unit any price changes for gasoline or 
diesel fuel in “real-time.”100 The government’s transparency unit then 
transmitted the price data to consumers, with the aim that they could easily 
find the cheapest petrol nearby. One economic study found that rather than 
lowering prices, the enhanced market transparency actually increased 
prices further. Compared to the control group, retail petrol prices increased 
by about 1.2 to 3.3 euro cents, and diesel increased by about 2 euro cents.101 
Other studies also suggest an increase in transparency can facilitate 
tacit collusion.102 
 
 97 Fernando Luco, Who Benefits from Information Disclosure? The Case of Retail Gasoline, 11 
AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 277 (2019). 
 98 Id. The softening of competition was common across brands and was not limited to a single 
Chilean city. Interestingly, although the stations’ margins increased across Chile, the effect was not 
uniform: the petrol station margins “increased the most in areas with low or non-existent consumer 
search (low-income areas), while they increased the least, and even decreased, in areas with high search 
intensity (high-income areas).” 
 99 Fuel Sector Inquiry Final Report, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (May 2011), 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Sector%20Inquiries/Fuel%20Sector%20I
nquiry%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=14 [https://perma.cc/VE74-V289] 
(Together, the five companies had a combined share of approx. 64.6% of the annual fuel sales, with the 
remainder distributed among “a few other large oil companies and a large number of small and medium 
sized oil traders.”). 
 100 Ralf Dewenter et al., The Impact of the Market Transparency Unit for Fuels on Gasoline Prices 
in Germany (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics Discussion Paper No. 220, 2016), 
http://www.dice.hhu.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Fakultaeten/Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche_Fakultaet/DICE/
Discussion_Paper/220_Dewenter_Heimeshoff_Lueth.pdf [https://perma.cc/37Z2-RBLG]. 
 101 Id. at 5. More generally, we also note another interesting study on the impact of price matching 
guarantee as stabilizing tacit collusive mechanism in petrol markets. See Luís Cabral et al., Learning 
Collusion: Theory and Evidence from a Gasoline Market Price Matching Guarantee, CRESSE 1 
(March 2018), http://www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/2018_ps11_pa2.pdf [https://perma.cc/TKF8-XMEN]. 
 102 See, e.g., David P. Byrne & Nicolas de Roos, Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail 
Gasoline, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 592 (2017) (finding the systematic use of prices rather than explicit 
communication as a tool for tacit coordination); Tabled Paper by Griffith University Submitted to the 
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First, these outcomes, which make sense under the legal standard, are 
harder to explain under the “no collusion absent communications” theory. 
Under this economic theory, the government’s increase in transparency 
should not have prompted the rivals to increase prices further. Because 
sustaining tacit collusion among five competitors is implausible, in view of 
this economic theory, the oligopolists must have been actively 
communicating to sustain their supra-competitive pricing. They 
conceivably would have communicated their dissatisfaction with each other 
after their daily drive. 
Rather, the result is consistent with the legal acknowledgment of 
sustained tacit collusion where each competitor watches the others like 
hawks. To monitor pricing, the gas station owners in Germany would drive 
past specified competitor gas stations several times a day and note their 
prices. The monitored prices were then fed into the respective gasoline 
company’s electronic system. Generally, when one competitor increased its 
gas prices, rivals generally would respond between three to six hours 
later.103 Now, with increased transparency from the online pricing, the 
rivals can monitor and punish promptly. 
So, the increase in fuel prices was not the likely result of 
“communications.” Instead, it likely reflects tacit collusion, where firms 
who are aware of their interdependence, recognize that they will profit by 
acceding to the higher price rather than discounting. 
With pricing algorithms, the retaliation time is further reduced. As 
each firm taps into its rivals’ real-time pricing, no gas station likely profits 
 
Legislative Assembly of Queensland, The Impact of MyFuelNT on retail ULP prices in the Northern 
Territory, QUEENSL. PARLIAMENT (May 2018), http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Documents/
TableOffice/TabledPapers/2018/5618T565.pdf [https://perma.cc/VUZ7-5YMC] (finding “that the 
MyFueINT scheme had a small but significant positive impact” on retail ULP prices in Australia’s 
Northern Territory. Significant anticompetitive price effects were found across Darwin, Alice Springs 
and Katherine. As the authors note, the results of the study “should be treated with caution due to 1) 
limitations of the data, 2) changes in the sampling methodology 3) omitted variable bias.”). 
 103 Dewenter et al., supra note 100: 
If a round of price increases is begun by Aral, Shell reacts in 90% of the cases exactly three 
hours later with a price increase in all of the regional markets, thereby adjusting its price level to 
that of Aral. Vice-versa, when Shell starts a round of price increases, in 90% of the cases Aral 
follows suit, again after exactly three hours. Total also generally reacts with price rises in all of 
the regional markets three or three-and-a-half hours after the start of the price round. Jet and 
Esso also react in the same way to rounds of price increases started by Aral or Shell, although 
the response patterns differ in some of the regional markets. Nevertheless, it can be concluded 
that Jet often also raises its prices five hours after the start of a round of price increases, 
whereby it generally observes a price difference of one eurocent/litre to Aral and Shell’s prices. 
Esso reacts between three and six hours after the start of a round of price increases. It is also 
apparent that on some regional markets Jet and Esso only react to rounds of price increases 
started in the evenings on the morning of the following day. 
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by discounting. Given the velocity with which the pricing algorithms can 
adjust, each gas station will less likely develop among its customers a 
reputation as a price discounter. Accordingly, the competitors will have 
less incentive to discount. 
On the flip side, the algorithms’ velocity of pricing decisions can 
shorten the time period for signaling price increases in other industries. 
Firms would no longer have to rely on lengthy (e.g., thirty-day) advanced 
price announcements, where they wait and see what the competitive 
response is to decide whether to actually raise prices and to what extent. 
Computers can have multiple rounds whereby one firm increases prices and 
the rivals respond immediately and without the risk that the firm that 
initiates the price increase will lose many customers to rivals. Essentially, 
companies may now need only seconds, rather than days, to signal price 
increases to foster tacit collusion. 
As we shift from a world where rivals drive around town to see the 
price that their rivals charge to a world in which pricing algorithms can 
achieve this same price monitoring mechanism within milliseconds, the 
human logic to maximize profits remains. Importantly, the algorithms help 
effectuate this logic. Needless to say, algorithms will not immunize market 
participants from disruptive technologies, entrants, or mavericks. However, 
absent such threats, the market participants can use pricing algorithms to 
sustain tacit collusion (and do so without entering into any illicit 
communication or concerted practice). 
In an attempt to further stabilize the conscious parallelism, humans 
may use additional means. They could, for example, limit variations in the 
design of the algorithms, making it easier to follow. Such unilateral moves, 
even when undertaken by several firms, are unlikely to trigger antitrust 
liability under current laws, absent proof of illicit communication or lack of 
rational (and legal) strategy behind the move. Further, companies may 
invest in better tools to observe and imitate pricing decisions executed by 
other algorithms. Companies may, for example, introduce price matching 
guarantees to further support monitoring as deterrent mechanisms.104 The 
unilateral nature of the actions may well leave them outside the realm of 
Article 101 of TFEU, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and even, Section 5 of 
the FTC Act.105 Going a step further, humans may use algorithms in a more 
 
 104 Price match may create an incentive to follow price increases by the price leader. See Cabral et 
al., supra note 101, at 2. 
 105 See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. F.T.C., 729 F.2d 128, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating 
that to challenge the facilitating device, like a price matching guarantee, the FTC had to show (1) 
evidence that defendants tacitly or expressly agreed to the facilitating device to avoid competition, or 
(2) oppressiveness, such as (a) evidence of defendants’ anticompetitive intent or purpose or (b) the 
absence of an independent, legitimate business reason for defendants’ conduct). 
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aggressive way to decode the strategy used by competing algorithms and 
adjust accordingly.106 Depending on the technology used, this might trigger 
intervention. But if each company unilaterally decides to use an algorithm 
to help decode its rivals’ strategy, then the courts may find it perfectly legal 
(if plaintiff cannot prove an agreement or that the companies’ actions 
qualify as a “facilitating practice”).107 
To avoid the need to invest in decoding competing algorithms, 
companies may adopt a different approach and use the same provider for 
their pricing algorithm, or alternatively, the same provider for their 
dynamic pricing strategies. This move would create a hub-and-spoke 
interaction, like the one discussed in the introduction.108 Let us elaborate on 
this, using our example of gas stations. 
Competing gas stations could use the same company for pricing 
decision-making. When multiple players use the same algorithm, data 
points, and values, the likelihood for alignment increases. According to the 
Wall Street Journal, one example is the market for petrol in Rotterdam, 
Netherlands, where a number of petrol stations used the same provider—
the Danish company a2i Systems—for advanced analytics to determine 
petrol prices.109 Importantly, note that the provision by the same company 
of dynamic pricing services, and the creation of a possible hub-and-spoke 
relationship, do not clearly infringe the competition laws. On its website, 
the company a2i Systems provides a case study to illustrate how it helped 
OK Benzin, Denmark’s leading petrol station owner, avoid a price war: 
 
 106 See Michal S. Gal, Algorithms as Illegal Agreements, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 67 (2019) 
(noting that “the algorithms is a ‘recipe for action,’ which can be directly or indirectly observed by 
competitors”); see also Bruno Salcedo, Pricing Algorithms and Tacit Collusion (Nov. 1, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://brunosalcedo.com/docs/collusion.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K7L-2JXP]. 
 107 Note from the European Union, supra note 12, at 8: 
[O]ne could argue that through repeated interactions, two firms’ pricing algorithms could come 
to ‘decode’ each other, thus allowing each one to better anticipate the other’s reactions. 
However, the case-law is clear that Article 101 ‘does not deprive economic operators of the 
right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their 
competitors’ . . . Short of signalling . . . it is therefore not obvious that more sophisticated tools 
through which a firm merely observes another firm’s price and draws its own conclusion would 
qualify as ‘communication’ for Article 101 purposes. 
 108 On liability for hub-and-spoke conspiracy, see Case C-74/14, Eturas v. Competition Council of 
the Republic of Lithuania, 4 C.M.L.R. 19 (2016); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 
227 (1939); Summary of Commission Decision of 4 February 2015 Relating to a Proceeding under 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA 
Agreement (Case AT.39861 — Yen Interest Rate Derivatives), 2017 O.J. (C 305) 10; Tesco v. Office of 
Fair Trading [2012] CAT 31 (UK). 
 109 Sam Schechner, Why Do Gas Station Prices Constantly Change? Blame the Algorithm, WALL 
ST. J. (May 8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-do-gas-station-prices-constantly-change-
blame-the-algorithm-1494262674 [https://perma.cc/UR8H-KX8E]. 
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“Between 2007 and 2012 the market was characterized by fierce 
competition and high volatility. At the peak there were 10 to 20 price 
changes a day, and the spread between the highest and the lowest price of 
the day could be up to 15 eurocent.”110 In enlisting a2i Systems, the leading 
retail network of approximately 700 petrol stations (which accounted for 
25% of the Danish retail fuel market), sought “to improve the pricing 
analysis and decision process and optimize pricing according to their 
overall strategy in order to lower the cost of price wars or better yet, to 
avoid them.”111 As the Wall Street Journal reported, the complex algorithm 
operated by a2i Systems was tested against a control group which did not 
use the system to determine price. The result? “The group using the 
software averaged 5% higher margins.”112 For the petrol company, a2i 
Systems notes, this “means millions of Euros” more, annually.113 
Note that the a2i pricing algorithm was used to lower the cost of price 
wars or eliminate them altogether. This is not a case of a2i marketing its 
ability to coordinate a price-fixing cartel. That would subject it and the 
European petrol stations to civil liability. Rather, it is about the unilateral 
use of a decision-making algorithm to soften competition. It is about using 
the a2i pricing algorithm to service multiple clients. 
The sharing of the same focal point, in our opinion, should raise 
concerns in such instances and call for some form of intervention. The 
Hub-and-Spoke algorithmic structure brings us further away from typical 
tacit collusion, but is yet to be challenged by competition agencies. It is 
important to stress that it differs from a cartel being facilitated by a hub-
and-spoke structure.114 (The head of the DOJ in 2018 intimated a potential 
criminal case that may inform the legality of this practice.115) Indeed, it is 
 
 110 PriceCast Fuel Case Story, A2I SYSTEMS (Nov. 2011), https://www.a2isystems.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/PriceCast-Fuel-Case-Story-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HAB-SRRU]. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Schechner, supra note 109. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (finding an antitrust price-fixing 
conspiracy based on a hub-and-spoke conspiracy theory, where one actor (the “hub”), such as a 
distributor, enters into agreements with a number of actors (the “spokes”), such as movie studios, who 
are aware that the distributor is entering into similar agreements with each movie studio and that the 
success of the plan agreed to depends on the studios all performing in accordance with the agreements). 
 115 The head of the DOJ Antitrust Division said that the anticompetitive use could take a couple of 
forms, either two potential competitors using the same algorithm “as a way of effectuating a price-
fixing scheme. . . . We actually have a case that’s a criminal case that is going to be coming to 
conclusion in the next two weeks, I think, and then we will make public the use of that, and I believe it 
is the first of its kind.” John Eggerton, Delrahim: Criminal Case Against Anti-competitive Search 
Algorithms Coming, BROADCASTINGCABLE (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.broadcastingcable.com/
news/delrahim-criminal-case-against-anti-competitive-search-algorithms-coming 
[https://perma.cc/R4B2-MH62]. 
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an “incidental” hub-and-spoke, which while not driven by a cartel 
agreement, may nonetheless facilitate alignment. The UK Competition and 
Markets Authority expressed the greatest concern over this algorithmic 
hub-and-spoke structure, “because it simply requires firms to adopt the 
same algorithmic pricing model.”116 As we indicated in Virtual 
Competition, such incidental hub-and-spoke, while not indicative of a cartel 
agreement, could nonetheless undermine competition. 
Let us move beyond hub-and-spoke and note how algorithms may be 
used to amplify the effects of anticompetitive agreements. 
One recent example involves resale price maintenance (RPM), which 
is where the manufacturer/distributor agrees with the retailer on what the 
minimum price should be for the manufacturer’s product. Absent RPM, 
some retailers may discount that product to attract customers and increase 
sales. Historically, the manufacturer would monitor and individually punish 
retailers that sold the manufacturer’s product below its suggested retail 
price. For example, after punishing retailer A, the manufacturer would shift 
its attention to retailers B, C, and D. Punishing each offending retailer 
increases the manufacturer’s potential risks of antitrust liability, especially 
in jurisdictions where RPM is per se (or presumptively) illegal.117 
But in an environment in which pricing algorithms are used, the 
manufacturer may achieve the same outcome without communicating with 
each of the offending retailers. In its e-commerce sector inquiry, the 
European Commission found that retailers were increasingly using 
automatic software “for price monitoring and price setting.”118 Many, 
including the biggest online retailers, are using “pricing algorithms which 
automatically adapt retail prices to those of competitors.”119 In this 
environment, the manufacturer need not punish every offending retailer. 
Instead, the manufacturer would only have to punish one or two significant 
retailers that are discounting, and whose prices the other retailers’ pricing 
algorithms are tracking and matching. Once these discounters raise their 
 
 116 Competition and Mkt. Auth., supra note 26. 
 117 RPM is presumptively illegal in Europe and in some states in the US. See A.B.A Pricing 
Conduct, Corporate 
Counseling, and International Committees, Around the World Enforcement Update on Resale Price 
Maintenance 30-37 (July 11, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/antitrust_law/20160711_at160711_materials.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/PDJ4-
XH2S]; Michael A. Lindsay, Repatching the Quilt: An Update on State RPM Laws, 13 ANTITRUST 
SOURCE (Feb. 2014). RPM was per se illegal for nearly a century under the Sherman Act until the 
Supreme Court, in a controversial 5-4 decision, subjected it to a more deferential rule of reason 
standard. See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 118 European Commission Press Release IP/18/4601, Antitrust: Commission Fines Four Consumer 
Electronics Manufacturers for Fixing Online Resale Prices (July 24, 2018). 
 119 Id. 
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prices, the other retailers’ pricing algorithms will automatically follow. The 
manufacturer’s risk of detection and ensuing antitrust liability is reduced, 
due to the more limited communications.120 
The Commission observed this anticompetitive dynamic in a 2018 
vertical price-fixing case. As the Commission found, because many, 
including the biggest online retailers, were using pricing algorithms that 
automatically adapted the retail prices to those of competitors, the resale 
“pricing restrictions imposed on low pricing online retailers typically had a 
broader impact on overall online prices for the respective consumer 
electronics products.”121 In effect, the consumer electronics manufacturer 
only had to punish a few online discounters, and could be assured that 
many other retailers would automatically increase their prices. Thus, even 
in industries not susceptible to tacit collusion, one can obtain the same 
effect when manufacturers vertically fix prices with one significant retailer, 
and the other retailers’ pricing algorithms automatically follow suit. 
Consequently, the emerging evidence suggests that enforcers will likely 
uncover evidence of anticompetitive human intent in using relatively 
“simple” algorithms to sustain tacit collusion without any evidence of 
actual communications. After all, tech firms currently promote how their 
price optimization software can put an end to price wars before they even 
begin. 
B. Artificial Intelligence 
Now, let us turn to our fourth scenario, Digital Eye, where we raise 
the question of whether conscious parallelism could be established by self-
learning algorithms without the humans’ express intent or direction. Could 
algorithms that are based on reinforced learning provide a superior tool to 
sustain tacit collusion? And if so, when left to their own devices, might the 
pricing algorithms identify conscious parallelism as a superior strategy? 
The question is whether in future markets, where the majority of 
pricing decisions will involve minimal human intervention, price levels 
may be established above competitive levels – not as a result of express 
collusion, nor as a result of humans appreciating the benefits of tacit 
collusion (and programming their pricing algorithms accordingly), but 
rather the result of action taken by independent learning algorithms that 
take account of various data points. 
 
 120 Background note by the Secretariat, Hub and Spoke Arrangements, OECD Doc. 
DAF/COMP(2019)14 (Oct. 17, 2019), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2019)14/en/pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R5KW-EMP6]. 
 121 See European Commission Press Release IP/18/4601, supra note 118. 
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We are beginning to see Wall Street firms shift from simpler, 
programmed algorithms to machine-learning algorithms that pick the 
optimal trading strategy. As The Economist observed in 2019: 
Quant funds can be divided into two groups: those like Stockfish [the best 
chess game engine programmed with human tactics], which use machines to 
mimic human strategies; and those like AlphaZero [Google’s self-learning 
computer program that had been given only the rules of chess and then taught 
itself how to play], which create strategies themselves. For 30 years 
quantitative investing started with a hypothesis, says a quant investor. 
Investors would test it against historical data and make a judgment as to 
whether it would continue to be useful. Now the order has been reversed. “We 
start with the data and look for a hypothesis,” he says. 
Humans are not out of the picture entirely. Their role is to pick and choose 
which data to feed into the machine. “You have to tell the algorithm what data 
to look at,” says the same investor. “If you apply a machine-learning 
algorithm to too large a dataset often it tends to revert to a very simple 
strategy, like momentum.” 
But just as AlphaZero found strategies that looked distinctly inhuman, Mr 
Jacobs of Lazard says AI-driven algorithmic investing often identifies factors 
that humans have not. The human minders may seek to understand what the 
machine has spotted to find new “explainable” factors. Such new factors will 
eventually join the current ones. But for a time they will give an advantage to 
those who hold them.122 
Again, we should start by stressing that the issue is not about 
algorithms conspiring against humans, but rather, whether a self-learning 
algorithm that is programmed to optimize profit by interacting in a dynamic 
environment, may identify conscious parallelism as an optimal strategy and 
identify unique means to foster this tacit collusion. 
Much is still uncertain as to the capacity of future reinforced-learning 
or deep learning algorithms to reach conscious parallelism with no human 
intervention.123 Doubts as to learning algorithms’ ability to sustain collusion 
 
 122 The Stock Market Is Now Run by Computers, Algorithms and Passive Managers, ECONOMIST 
(Oct. 5, 2019), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/10/05/the-stockmarket-is-now-run-by-
computers-algorithms-and-passive-managers [https://perma.cc/5PXT-HQRB]. 
 123 As the ACCC summarized: 
“Machine learning” and related “deep learning” technology enable software to autonomously 
improve its knowledge and processes through iteration and experience, without being explicitly 
programmed with new information or instructions. This can include: 
algorithms that teach machines to learn cause and effect by analyzing samples of data that were 
manually labelled in order to highlight clear distinctions between different features of data 
(supervised learning) 
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refer to their increased sophistication, which could make alignment 
difficult. Doubts are also linked to the need and ability of algorithms to 
establish a hidden channel of communication, that may address problems of 
entering and sustaining collusion.124 While acknowledging current 
uncertainty, competition agencies around the world have begun looking 
into these developments. The technology is still at its infancy, but it is 
important to acknowledge that the tech industry is taking its first steps in 
this direction for its algorithms. 
 
From an enforcement perspective, and at a high level of 
simplification, one may envisage two outcomes: 
1. Outcome 1 
If the algorithms are uncapable of autonomously reaching tacit 
collusion, humans in markets that tilt toward conscious parallelism would 
either train them to achieve that outcome, program them with human 
strategies that foster tacit collusion, or refrain from using the algorithms (as 
such use, absent any significant offsetting gains and efficiencies, would 
reduce profits). Accordingly, in a market where humans appreciate the 
benefits of interdependence, and can do so without infringing the 
competition laws, they would not introduce uncontrolled disruptors that 
could unleash a price war. They will continue using simple adaptive 
algorithms. 
Indeed, we have not found that in the online context that any third-
party developer of pricing algorithms that promotes its algorithms’ ability 
to unleash and prevail in an all-out price war. If self-learning pricing 
algorithms reduced overall profits by destabilizing pre-existing tacit 
collusion, competitors would unlikely employ them. Thus, in industries 
already susceptible to tacit collusion, companies would ensure alignment of 
the learning algorithm with the overall strategy. They would ensure to 
exploit the freedom offered to them under the law and unilaterally use 
adaptive or simple algorithms. Under this scenario we return to our 
previous category of human-driven tacit collusion enhanced by algorithms. 
 
algorithms that try to identify hidden structures and patterns from unlabeled data (unsupervised 
learning) 
algorithms performing tasks and learning through trial and error (reinforced learning). 
ACCC, Digital Platform Inquiry Final Report, ACCC 523 (July 26, 2019), 
https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/digital-platforms-inquiry-final-report [https://perma.cc/NQA3-
C6WU]. 
 124 For papers dismissing the possibility for algorithm-driven tacit collusion, see Schwalbe, supra 
note 16. 
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The question is whether such use should be condemned by competition law 
or remain unchallenged. 
2. Outcome 2 
If, on the other hand, self-learning algorithms could solve the 
coordination problem through trial- and-error and with no human 
intervention, then we face an additional complexity in the form of 
undetected and unchallenged conscious parallelism. In such scenarios, 
algorithms can learn through experimentation and without the knowledge 
of the human executives to shift from competitive pricing rules to collusive 
pricing rules and sustain that new anticompetitive equilibrium. 
Economists and computer scientists are now exploring this avenue. 
Research has already shown how, under certain conditions, reinforcement 
learning can sustain cooperation.125 Furthermore, learning algorithms have 
been shown to gravitate toward conscious parallelism in simple 
oligopolistic setting.126 These observations support the possibility that self-
learning algorithms may autonomously establish conscious parallelism with 
no human input in environments in which they operate in parallel (rather 
than only in simplified environments, in which they face a stable fixed-
strategy opponent). 
With all the uncertainty and caveats in mind, let us briefly note recent 
observations of one group of scholars who have shown that self-learning 
algorithms can have the capacity to achieve coordination on the tacit 
collusive outcome.127 In experiments with two Q-learning pricing 
algorithms, tacit collusion emerged in more than 60% of the cases, and at 
even higher levels following sufficient simulation. Importantly, these 
results were observed in significantly rich environment with up to 100 price 
levels. As illustrated below, forcing a price deviation by one algorithm to 
the “Nash Price” (in this experiment, reflecting the static equilibrium price 
which would emerge if there was no tacit coordination), led the other Q-
learning algorithm to react. Subsequently, both returned to the pre-existing 
 
 125 See, e.g., Jacob W. Crandall et al., Cooperating with Machines, 9 NATURE COMM. 233, 233, 
240 (2018); Joel Z. Leibo et al., Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND 
MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS 464, 469-71 (2017), http://www.ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas2017/
pdfs/p464.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HXZ-ZSUQ] (analyzing fruit gathering and wolfpack hunting games, 
and illustrating conflict emergence and dilemmas affecting cooperation). 
 126 See Timo Klein, Autonomous Algorithmic Collusion: Q-Learning Under Sequential Pricing, 
(Tinbergen Institute, Discussion Paper TI 2018-056/VII), https://papers.tinbergen.nl/18056.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CB9K-KDPG]; Gerald Tesauro & Jeffrey O. Kephart, Pricing in Agent Economies 
Using Multi-Agent Q-Learning, 5 AUTONOMOUS AGENTS & MULTI-AGENT SYS. 289, 301-02 (2002). 
 127 Emilio Calvano et al., Algorithmic Pricing: What Implications for Competition Policy?, 1 REV. 
INDUS. ORG. 155 (2019). 
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price level, which represents the tacit collusive equilibrium (which is above 
the competitive price, but below the monopolistic (cooperation) price). And 
so, the self-learning algorithms identified tacit collusion as an optimal 
strategy. When one of the pricing algorithms diverted from that price, the 
other algorithm reacted (thus making the diversion unprofitable), leading 
both to return to a higher anticompetitive price point, which, if applied in 
the real world, would benefit the companies, and harm the consumer. 
Importantly, this outcome was achieved without human guidance or 
programming. 
 
Source: Calvano et al., Q-Learning to Cooperate128 
 
In an extension of their experiment, Professors Calvano, Calzolari, 
Denicolò and Pastorello used three Q-learning algorithms (that is, more 
than what some argue is possible for tacit collusion without 
communications) in a rich price environment. Their experiment again 
found conscious parallelism and increased profitability with short learning 
times. The scholars observed how difficult it may be to detect such 
algorithmic tacit collusion: “What is most worrying is that the algorithms 
leave no trace of concerted action – they learn to collude purely by trial and 
error, with no prior knowledge of the environment in which they operate, 
without communicating with one another, and without being specifically 
designed or instructed to collude.”129 
 
 128 Emilio Calvano et al., Q-Learning to Cooperate, Address at the NBER Economics of Artificial 
Intelligence Conference 2018 (Sept. 14, 2018), slides available at https://conference.nber.org/
conf_papers/f114616.slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YDF-VA3C]. 
 129 Emilio Calvano et al., Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion, VOXEU.ORG 
(Feb. 3, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/artificial-intelligence-algorithmic-pricing-and-collusion [https://
perma.cc/6WTL-DAMS]. 
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Researchers are continuing to experiment the likelihood of algorithmic 
tacit collusion in even more complex environments - with increased and 
changing numbers of algorithms, increased sophistication of algorithms, 
and increased price levels. 
As the economist Ai Deng noted, the algorithm in the researchers’ 
experiments took “an average of 850,000 periods of training to learn to 
‘tacitly collude.’”130 While that amounts to less than one minute of CPU 
time, he noted that in the real world, the algorithms “learn” after 97 years if 
they change prices every hour, and companies may not allow the algorithm 
to learn on the job. So, companies will likely first train their algorithms off-
line, which means they might know of their algorithms’ capacity to collude 
and may take steps to enhance it. 
We are still early in the development of AI and its application to 
pricing decisions. Uncertainty remains as to the operation of future 
markets, costs associated with the learning phase, the ability to simulate 
and operate in a multi-agent environment, and the likely competitive effects 
in different markets as the complexity and diversity of self-learning 
algorithms increase.131 Furthermore, developments in the ability of 
algorithms to signal,132 monitor, decode and communicate in stealth 
mode,133 will affect any future equilibria. But we encourage researchers to 
continue to develop algorithmic tacit collusion incubators that model rich 
and realistic environments. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
If the current pricing algorithms leave no trace of their concerted 
action in the lab, then these self-learning algorithms – when unleashed in 
concentrated industries – may escape detection from the unwitting antitrust 
enforcer who assumes that this collusion will somehow be detected. 
Pricing algorithm suppliers already tout, as a benefit, their clients’ 
avoiding price wars. If this is real, and not marketing hype, then there are 
significant potential profits from algorithms that can foster tacit collusion. 
 
 130 Ai Deng, How Concerned Should We Be About Algorithmic Tacit Collusion? Comments on 
Calvano et al. (unpublished working paper, NERA Economic Consulting and Johns Hopkins 
University) (October 11, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3467923 [https://perma.cc/Z7KW-5YGQ]. 
 131 See, e.g., Mary McGlohon & Sandip Sen, Learning to Cooperate in Multi-agent Systems by 
Combining Q-learning and Evolutionary Strategy (unpublished working paper, The University of 
Tulsa), http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~mmcgloho/pubs/wclc.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9J9-ME37]. 
 132 See, e.g., Jacob W. Crandall et al., Cooperating with Machines, 9 NATURE COMMC’NS 233 
(2018); see also Gal, supra note 106. 
 133 See, e.g., Martín Abadi & David G. Andersen, Learning to Protect Communications with 
Adversarial Neural Cryptography (Oct. 24, 2016) (unpublished working paper, Google Brain), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.06918.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HDP-XEJB]. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
256 
This would represent an area ripe for further exploration by companies and 
developers of pricing algorithms, who, at present, benefit from an emerging 
gap in antitrust enforcement that may enable the attainment of higher 
profits (without the fear of antitrust liability, which includes in the US, 
criminal fines, incarceration, and treble damages for the injured antitrust 
plaintiffs). 
This emerging gap merits closer consideration by competition 
agencies. But algorithmic tacit collusion can be even harder to detect – 
especially when the algorithms leave no trace of concerted action. As EU 
Commissioner Vestager noted, “[t]he trouble is, it’s not easy to know 
exactly how those algorithms work. How they’ve decided what to show us, 
and what to hide. And yet the decisions they make affect us all.”134 
Likewise, the UK competition authority recognized the “complexity of 
algorithms and the consequent challenge of understanding their exact 
operation and effects can . . . make it more difficult for consumers and 
enforcement agencies to detect algorithmic abuses and gather relevant 
evidence.”135 Even if the competition agencies detect tacit collusion, the 
current law limits their ability to challenge it. 
So, where does this leave us? 
If one accepts tacit coordination as a material risk in susceptible 
industries, then the competition agencies must develop tools to assess (and 
deter) this risk.136 No doubt enforcement action, at times, will be 
challenging. After all, condemning rational reaction for market 
characteristics would, in itself, distort competition. Condemning it when it 
is assisted by bots may lead to a similar anomaly. Identifying, auditing, or 
monitoring algorithms may be expensive and illusive. Using means to 
affect market transparency, undermine detection, or delay reaction can 
undermine the essence of competition. 
These challenges should give us a pause. When considering any likely 
enforcement action, we must acknowledge the costs of over-intervention. 
Yet, the cost of under-intervention must also be acknowledged, especially 
when premised on the theory that tacit collusion is implausible without 
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human communication. Consumers and enforcers with the current tools 
cannot blunt the siren song of profits from algorithmic tacit collusion. 
So, what are three things that the United States and other jurisdictions 
can do to better understand and deter algorithmic tacit collusion? 
The first step is to better understand the risks of algorithmic collusion. 
The French and German antitrust agencies conducted a joint research 
project to investigate algorithms and their implications on competition.137 
The European Commission has also announced a consultation process with 
a view towards shaping competition policy in the era of digitization. Thus, 
the US, where the FTC and DOJ are both currently investigating the tech 
platforms, should coordinate efforts with these other agencies. 
Moreover, Germany’s Monopolies Commission in 2018, offered 
several additional proposals to better understand the risks of algorithmic 
tacit collusion.138 The Commission recommends, among other things, that 
the competition authorities systematically investigate markets 
with algorithm-based pricing for adverse effects on competition. Sector 
inquiries (which the FTC can undertake in the US), should be used more 
often to identify markets at risk. Additionally, consumer associations could 
be given a right to initiate competition sector inquiries, as they are most 
likely to receive information about potentially coordinated prices. 
Competition agencies should also have dedicated teams dealing with 
algorithmic collusion and other competition issues raised by Big Data and 
AI. The Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, for example, 
has a Data Analytics Unit to analyze and build its expertise on pricing 
algorithms, help conduct market studies, and support the work of the 
antitrust agency’s investigations teams and economists.139 
After better understanding the risks of algorithmic collusion, the 
agencies’ next step is to improve their tools in detecting collusion. 
Collusion -- whether express or tacit -- is already difficult to detect. In a 
market dominated by algorithms, the dynamic algorithmic price may be the 
only ascertainable price. Absent a natural experiment or counterfactual 
(such as a similar market without algorithms), enforcers may not readily 
discern whether (and why) the market price is too high. Is it the result of 
artificial intervention or natural supply and demand dynamics? One key 
tool that we discuss elsewhere is developing Algorithmic Collusion 
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Incubators, a computer simulation which takes into account the market 
characteristics, demand, and supply, and enables competition officials to 
test under what conditions tacit collusion occurs, and the effects and 
likelihood of different counter-measures to destabilize this conscious 
parallelism.140 Basically, antitrust enforcers should use pricing algorithms 
deployed in the field to see pricing levels (and margins) for particular 
products. It would be of interest if the agency could inquire how algorithms 
responded in their simulations when one competitor exited (or entered) the 
marketplace (perhaps informing future merger review). 
Third, once the agencies have a better understanding of the risks of 
algorithmic tacit collusion, and if the evidence shows that the use of pricing 
algorithms enhances collusive market results and obfuscates its discovery, 
then the agencies should consider updating current antitrust policies. 
Germany’s Monopolies Commission, for example, considers two legal 
aspects: 
 Reversal of the burden of proof in competition proceedings 
with regard to the damage caused by an infringement of 
competition law; meaning that the finding of a collusive use 
of price algorithms would give rise to the presumption of an 
excessive price. 
 Far-reaching extension of liability for competition law 
infringements to third parties such as IT service providers 
regarding the design of price algorithms. 
A primary way to deter tacit collusion is merger review. In markets 
where pricing algorithms are present and the risk of algorithmic tacit 
collusion is great, then the competition agencies should consider lowering 
their threshold of intervention and investigate the risk of coordinated 
effects not only in cases of 3 – to – 2 mergers, but also potentially also in 4 
– to – 3 or even in 5 – to – 4 mergers, and to reconsider the approach to 
conglomerate mergers when tacit collusion can be facilitated by 
multimarket contacts.141 
This may also require the agencies to distinguish their approach to 
human and algorithmic tacit collusion. It will likely require a refined 
approach that identifies and punishes instances where algorithms are used 
to facilitate collusion. A refinement of the approach to signalling may be a 
good place to start. Restrictions on certain market manipulations (through 
bots that underscore parallelism) may be another. The issue should be 
approached in a measured manner, and as part of the continual adjustment 
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of antitrust policy to market and technological reality. Failing to do so, may 
well lead us to future markets where a competitive price is a mere illusion, 
and price optimization is used as code for tacit collusion’s supra-
competitive profits. 
CONCLUSION 
Price-fixing cartels, despite the fines, leniency programs, and in some 
jurisdictions, criminal penalties, persist. Enforcers and policy makers 
increasingly recognize that their current antitrust enforcement tools are 
even more limited in effectively deterring algorithmic tacit collusion.142 The 
current tools to combat price-fixing do not materially deter tacit collusion. 
And merger review, the primary mechanism to deter conscious parallelism, 
is likely misaligned with the true ability of markets to support algorithmic 
tacit collusion. As a result, competition will likely soften, and consumers 
will pay the price. 
As brick-and-mortar shops are closing at a faster rate, as sellers and 
buyers migrate to the online world, and as technology, communications, 
big data and big analytics reach new highs, the effects of pricing algorithms 
will become more prominent. In the digitalised environment, tacit collusion 
might turn from being a mere outcome of market characteristics, into a 
strategy. While the phenomenon of tacit collusion is limited to markets 
with given characteristics, it nonetheless is likely to exhibit greater 
durability in an algorithm-driven environment. 
So, with that risk in mind, we are encouraged that many policy makers 
and competition agencies are not only taking this risk seriously but are 
devoting resources to better understand the implications of algorithmic 
collusion. While it might not be as glamorous as the dawn raid, their efforts 
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